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STATEMENT ON JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0) and/or Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). This appeal is taken from a final Order
and Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah,
pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court fail to follow the directive of this Court in TWN I1 in

granting judgment in favor of TWN where TWN did not present evidence that was
"explicit and forthcoming" regarding Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed
to Zions with the word "trustee" typed below his signature sufficient to rebut the
presumption of descriptio personael This is a mixed question of fact and law. Factual
findings of the trial court will be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard, and
questions of law will be reviewed under a "correctness" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994); State v. L.N., 2004 UT App 120,111,91 P.3d 836, 838. [Issue
preserved: R. 1380 at 118-123; R. 975 at 6; TWNL]
2.

Did the trial court err in allowing Mr. Christenson to read his Affidavit into

evidence pursuant to the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule, U.R.E.
803(5), where the Affidavit was prepared fourteen years after the events set forth therein
1

"TWNI" refers to this Court's prior opinion in this case entitled TWN, Inc. v.
Michel, 2003 UT App 70; 66 P.3d 1031, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum
C. [See also R. 824.] Citations to the Court's opinion in TWN I will be made by referring
to "TWN I" and the page or paragraph number being cited (see, e.g., TWNI&t ^ 1).
-1-

took place, and not when the subject matter of the Affidavit was fresh in Mr.
Christenson's memory? This issue will be reviewed under a "correctness" standard. A
trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its ruling typically will
be disturbed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. However, when the evidentiary
ruling involves an independent legal issue and does not involve the balancing of factors,
the appellate court reviews the determination for correctness. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT
96,121, 989 P.2d 52, 58 (1999). [Issue preserved: R. 1379 at 18.]
3.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Mr. Christenson did not convey to Zions

his individual interest in the Property when he signed the 1985 Deed to Zions where he
testified that he could not recall his intent in signing that deed and where the clear weight
of the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Christenson intended to convey to Zions his entire
interest in the Property and that he understood thereafter that he had no further interest in
the Property? This is a question of fact. Factual findings of the trial court will be
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ^f 15; State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). [Issue preserved: R. 1380 at 118-123.]
4.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the Michels had not properly raised or

preserved their defense that TWN's claim to be the actual owner of the Property was
barred under the doctrine of res judicata? This issue involves a question of law.
Questions of law will be reviewed on appeal under a "correctness" standard. Stangl v.
Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1997). [Issue preserved: R.
1380 at 114-118, 123; R. 1296; R. 1267; R. 1254; R. 975 at 6-8.]

5.

Did the trial court err in failing to rule that TWN's claim to be the owner of

the Property was barred by res judicata, where the summary judgment order entered
against Mr. Christensen in August 2000 in his Salt Lake County lawsuit against the
Michels declared that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in the Property and
where TWN claims title to the Property through Mr. Christenson? This issue involves a
question of law. Questions of law will be reviewed on appeal under a "correctness"
standard. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1997). [Issue
preserved: R. 1380 at 114-118, 123; R. 1296; R. 1267; R. 975 at 6-8.]
6.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the Michels had not properly raised their

defense that the 1984 Tax Sale was invalid and the Tax Deed was void ab initio on the
ground that Utah County lacked authority to sell at tax sale that portion of the Property
located in Salt Lake County, and in ruling that this issue was disposed of in TWN 17 This
issue involves a question of law. Questions of law will be reviewed on appeal under a
"correctness" standard. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App.
1997). [Issue preserved: R. 1380 at 123; R. 1267; R. 975 at 8.]
7.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the statute of limitations contained in

U.C.A. § 78-12-5.1 through -5.3 barred the Michels' invalid tax sale defense where this
defense was not based on procedural or technical deficiencies in the manner in which the
tax sale was conducted but instead involved the sale by Utah County of property located
in another county? This issue involves a question of law. Questions of law will be

-3-

reviewed on appeal under a "correctness" standard. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc.,
948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1997). [Issue preserved: R. 767 at 6-8; R. 975 at 8.]
8.

Does a county lack authority to assess taxes against real property located in

an adjacent county and hold a tax sale of such property upon non-payment of the assessed
taxes and, if so, did the trial court err in not ruling that the Tax Deed was void ab initio?
This issue involves a question of law. Questions of law will be reviewed under a
"correctness" standard. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App.
1997). [Issue preserved: TWNIat 8 n. 7; R. 1380 at 123, 127-130; R. 975 at 8; R. 767 at
1-5, 8-10; R. 668 at 2-3.]
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
U.C.A. § 59-2-213, § 59-2-301, § 59-2-303(1), § 59-2-325, § 59-2-1001.
U.C.A. § 78-12-5.1, § 78-12-5.2, § 78-12-5.3.
U.R.E. 803(5).

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court
Below.
This action was filed by TWN in July 1999 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of

Utah County to quiet title to an 83 acre tract of undeveloped real property located in Salt
Lake County and Utah County ["the Property"]. [R. 9; R. 755.]
Richard A. Christenson purchased the Property at a tax sale held by Utah County
in 1984, and received a Tax Deed to the Property. [Ex. 1.] In 1985, Mr. Christenson

conveyed the Property to Zions by quitclaim deed ["1985 Deed to Zions"] with the word
"Trustee" typed below his signature. [Ex. 2.] Mr. Christensen's company, Franklin
Financial, purchased the Property from Zions a year later, received a warranty deed to the
Property from Zions, and gave a trust deed on the Property to secure the repayment of a
loan obtained from Zions. Appellants Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel ["the Michels"]
purchased the Property in 1993 at a foreclosure sale held by Zions after Mr. Christenson's
company defaulted on its loan, and the Michels received a Trustee's Deed to the Property.
[Ex. 4; R. 1380 at 22.] Appellee TWN, Inc. ["TWN"] claims ownership of the Property
pursuant to a quitclaim deed executed by Mr. Christenson in 1998. [Ex. 3.]
The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of TWN, ruling that
the 1985 Deed to Zions only conveyed Mr. Christensen's interest in the Property as
trustee for an undisclosed trust, and did not divest Mr. Christensen of all title and interest
that he held in the Property. [R. 785.] On appeal, this Court reversed the summary
judgment, holding that the word "trustee" appearing beneath Mr. Christenson's name on
the 1985 Deed to Zions was not sufficient, by itself, to restrict the conveyance only to
whatever interest Mr. Christenson held in trust, pursuant to the doctrine of descriptio
personae. [TWNI at ^ 5.] The Court did not address the other issues raised on appeal.
[See TWN I at 8 n.7.]
Following remand, a trial was held on August 1, 2004. [R. 1379.] At trial, Mr.
Christenson testified that he could not remember his intent in signing the 1985 Deed to
Zions with the word "Trustee" next to his name. [R. 1379 at 28, 31.] He was shown an

Affidavit that he had signed in 1999, some fourteen years after the 1985 Deed to Zions
was executed, but the Affidavit did not refresh his recollection regarding his intent in
1985. [R. 1379 at 22.] The Michaels objected to TWN's request to allow the witness to
read the Affidavit into evidence under U.R.E. 803(5), but the trial court permitted the
reading of the Affidavit at trial. [R. 1379 at 18, 23-25.]
At the conclusion of TWN's case in chief, the trial court granted the Michels'
motion to dismiss, ruling that TWN had not presented any persuasive evidence regarding
Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "trustee"
following his name, and did not establish that Mr. Christenson had a specific intent to
sign the deed for a trust. [R. 1379 at 43.] After the Michels had left the courthouse, the
trial judge summoned the attorneys back to the courtroom, stated that he was striking his
order granting the motion to dismiss, and, after further argument, denied the motion to
dismiss, indicating that evidence had been presented by TWN "that responds to the
question" and ordered that the case continue. [R. 1379 at 44, 54.] The remainder of the
trial was held on August 31, 2004. [R. 1380.] Following the completion of the trial, and
after further briefing by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of TWN, and
subsequently entered its Order and Judgment quieting title to the Property in TWN. [R.
1303; R. 1362.]
The Michels filed a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Order and Judgment on
December 3, 2004. [R. 1364.] On February 4, 2005, TWN filed with this Court a Motion
for Summary Disposition and a Motion to Release Lis Pendens or to Require a Guarantee.

This Court denied the Motion to Release Lis Pendens or to Require a Guarantee on April
28, 2005, and denied the Motion for Summary Disposition on April 29, 2005.
B.

Statement of Facts,2
The Property that is the subject of this action consists of approximately 83 acres of

land, the majority of which is located in Utah County, with the remainder located in Salt
Lake County. [See TWNI at ^ 1; R. 755 at f 2; R. 1379 at 6-7.] As of 1984, Zions Bank
["Zions"] was the record owner of the Property. [TWNI at 12; R. 755 at 2, \ 6.] Prior to
May 1984, Utah County, erroneously believing that the Property was located entirely
within Utah County, sent out tax billings on the Property. In May 1984, after the taxes
had not been paid, Utah County sold the Property at a tax sale ["Tax Sale"] to Richard A.
Christenson for $1,297.93. [ 7 W / a t f 2 andn.l; R. 755 atffl[ 1-5; R. 1380 at 9; Ex. 1.]
Following the Tax Sale, Mr. Christenson was issued an auditor's tax deed ["Tax Deed"].
[Ex. 1; R. 1380 at 8, 9.] It was not until 1995, when a new survey was conducted, that it
was discovered that part of the Property actually was in Salt Lake County. [TWNI at 1
n.l;R.755at2,T}8.]
In 1985, Zions reimbursed Mr. Christenson for the amount paid by him to purchase
the Property at the Tax Sale. [R. 1380 at 10-12.] In return, Mr. Christensen executed the
1985 Deed to Zions, whereby the Property and another Salt Lake County property ["Other
SLC Property"] were conveyed to Zions. [TWNIat 2 , f 3 ; R. 1380 at 11; Ex. 2.] The

2

A time line of some of the relevant dates and events in this case is attached hereto
as Addendum G.

1985 Deed to Zions was signed by Mr. Christenson with the word "Trustee" printed under
his signature. [TWNI at lj 3; Ex. 2.]
In September 1986, Zions sold the Property and the Other SLC Property to
Franklin Financial ["Franklin"], a company wholly owned by Mr. Christenson, and Zions
financed the sale. [TWNIat^ 3; R. 1380 at 16, 20-21.] Zions conveyed those properties
to Franklin by warranty deed [Ex. 5.], and gave Zions a trust deed on the properties to
secure the repayment of the loan. [Ex. 6; R. 1380 at 20-21.] After Franklin defaulted on
its loan, Zions foreclosed on the properties at a non-judicial foreclosure sale held on April
13, 1993. [R. 1380 at 22.] The Michels were the high bidders at the trustee's sale, and
received a Trustee's Deed to the Property and the Other SLC Property ["Trustee's
Deed"]. [TWNI at \3; R. 1380 at 22; Ex. 4.]
In 1998, Mr. Christensen executed a quitclaim deed to TWN ["1998 Deed to
TWN"], conveying any interest that he had in the Property to TWN. [See TWN I at % 4;
Ex. 3.] In 1999, TWN brought this action to quiet title to the Property.
In November 2001, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TWN,
ruling that just because the 1985 Deed to Zions had the word "Trustee" typed below Mr.
Christenson's signature, the deed did not convey Mr. Christenson's personal interest in
the Property, but only whatever interest Mr. Christenson held on behalf of an unnamed
trust, which was apparently nothing. [See TWN I at If 5; R. 240 at 2.]
The Michels appealed the trial court's summary judgment order. At oral argument
the parties acknowledged that Mr. Christenson likely did not actually hold any interest in

the Property on behalf of a trust. No explanation was offered as to why Mr. Christenson
would cause his company to acquire title to the Property from Zions for a considerable
sum of money if he actually believed that Zions had not acquired title to the Property
from him in 1985 and thus had nothing to convey to his company. [See TWNIat 2 n. 2.]
On appeal, this Court reversed the summary judgment, holding that, under the
doctrine of descriptio personae^
[t]he unexplained use of the word "trustee" on a real property deed does
not, absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a
trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust interest. Therefore, in both
contexts, the deed should be read and interpreted as if the word "trustee"
were not there. [7¥W7atf 12.]
This Court also held in TWNI that while a trustee may dispose of trust property in
the name of the trustee as trustee, see U.C.A. § 75-7-402(5),
a trustee's intent to do so must be made clearer than simply placing the
unadorned word "trustee" after his or her name. A trustee-grantor should
include on the deed such language as "in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ
trust." Alternatively, as the Utah Supreme Court suggested in Boise
Cascade Corp., a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust
was, in fact, intended. See 655 P.2d at 669 (suggesting that a counteraffidavit could have rebutted the presumption of descriptio personae and
shown that the descriptive language was intended to bind the person in his
representative capacity rather than in his individual capacity). Otherwise,
the presumption of descriptio personae will apply, and the deed will operate
as if the word "trustee" were not there.
[TWNIzt<k\4.]
At the conclusion of its decision in TWN7, this Court held that "the word 'trustee'
appearing next to Mr. Christenson's name on the 1985 Deed to Zions was not sufficient,
by itself, to restrict the conveyance only to whatever interest Mr. Christenson held in

-9-

trust." For that reason, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
and remanded the case to the trial court "for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion." [TWNI at % 15.]
Following remand, a trial was held. Mr. Christenson testified to the events giving
rise to his purchase of the Property at the Tax Sale, which he said he did to protect the
Property for Zions. [R. 1380 at 8-9.] Mr. Christenson testified that he recalled the
circumstances surrounding his receipt of the Tax Deed in 1984 following the purchase of
the Property at the Tax Sale and that it was his understanding following the receipt of the
Tax Deed that he owned the Property. [R. 1380 at 7, 10.]
Mr. Christenson testified that Zions reimbursed him for the amount that he had
paid to purchase the Property at the Tax Sale, whereupon he gave the bank the 1985 Deed
to Zions. [TWNI at f 3; R. 1380 at 10-12.] He testified that he could not remember the
capacity in which he intended to sign the 1985 Deed to Zions, what his intent was in
executing that deed, or the circumstances regarding the creation of that deed. [R. 1379 at
28, 31; R. 1380 at 13-14.] He also did not know what he intended to convey by signing
the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "Trustee" on the deed. [R. 1379 at 30.]
The evidence at trial established that following the recording of the 1985 Deed to
Zions, the Utah County Recorder's office showed that title to the property was vested in
Zions, not Mr. Christenson. [R. 1380 at 91; Ex. 12 at f 7.] The evidence also showed
that at no time following the recording of the deed did the Utah County Assessor's office
assess property taxes on the Property to Mr. Christenson. [R. 1380 at 91; Ex. 12 at ^f 8.]

At trial, Mr. Christenson was shown an affidavit that he had signed on January 14,
1999 [the "Affidavit"]. [R. 1379 at 17.] The Affidavit was signed fourteen years after
the 1985 Deed to Zions was executed, one month after Mr. Christenson signed the 1998
Deed to TWN, and six months before this action was commenced. [R. 1379 at 20; Exs. 2
and 3; R. 9 at 6.] After reading the Affidavit to himself, he stated that it did not refresh
his recollection regarding the signing of the 1985 Deed to Zions or the reason he signed
that deed with the word "Trustee" next to his signature. [R. 1379 at 22.]
Mr. Christenson claimed that the statements in the Affidavit were true and
reflected his recollection at the time he signed the Affidavit. [R. 1379 at 17-18.] He
provided no testimony or other evidence, however, regarding who had prepared the
Affidavit, why it had been prepared, why he had signed it, to whom it had been given, or
any other foundational information regarding the reason he signed it.
TWN's attorney asked the trial court for permission for Mr. Christenson to read
the Affidavit into evidence pursuant to the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay
rule, U.R.E. 803(5). [R. 1379 at 18.] The Michels' attorney objected, arguing that, under
Rule 803(5), TWN had to show that the Affidavit "was made or adopted by the witness
when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory," and that the Affidavit "certainly
wasn't made at or about the time it was fresh in his mind." [R. 1379 at 18.] Following
further discussion between the trial court and counsel and voir dire of the witness, the
trial court granted the request and allowed the witness to read the entire Affidavit into
evidence. [R. at 19-25.]. Part of what was read is as follows:
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The client has reviewed that certain quit-claim deed dated March 19th, 1985
[the 1985 Deed to Zions] . . . and declares that he signed said quit-claim
deed as trustee for Cape Trust to transfer the interest, if any, of Cape Trust
[in] subject property and not any personal interest in Subject Property.
The legal description contained in Exhibit B differs from that of Exhibit A
because the interest being conveyed in Exhibit B was the interest of Cape
Trust and not the personal interest of Richard Christenson.
[R. 1379 at 24-25.]
No evidence was provided to support the conclusory statement in the Affidavit that
Mr. Christenson had signed the 1985 Deed to Zions only as trustee for Cape Trust. There
was no evidence that Cape Trust had any interest in the Property at that time.
Although Mr. Christenson claimed to be unable to recall anything about his intent
in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions, he did recall other events that were inconsistent with
the statement in the Affidavit that he had signed the 1985 Deed to Zions only as trustee
for Cape Trust. For example, Mr. Christenson testified that he recalled purchasing the
Property and the Other SLC Property on behalf of Franklin from Zions in 1986. [R. 1380
at 16.] The evidence established that Franklin agreed to pay $284,592 for those
properties. [R. 1380 at 16; Exs. 4 and 6.] Mr. Christenson recalled that his company
borrowed money from Zions in September 1986, and pledged the Property to Zions to
secure the loan. [R. 1380 at 20-21.] When Mr. Christenson was asked why he would
cause his company to buy back the Property from Zions if he claimed to own the
Property, Mr. Christenson simply responded, "I can't recall all the circumstances." [R.
1380 at 21.]

Mi Christenson testified that lie i ecalled tl lat Franklin defaulted on its loan to
Zions, that Zions held a foreclosure sale of tin
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Property or that he held legal title to the Property. [Ex. 8.] On August 3. 2000, summary
judgment was granted against Mr. Christenson in the SLC Lawsuit, holding that Mr.
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In September 2000, as part of the Michels' motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of TWN, the Michels raised
the defense that TWN's claim to be the owner of the Property was barred under the
doctrine of res judicata because of the Summary Judgment Order entered against Mr.
Christenson, TWN's predecessor-in-interest, in the SLC Lawsuit one month earlier. The
trial court did not specifically rule on this issue in its order denying the motion for
reconsideration. [R. 349; R. 490; R. 1380 at 127.]
The Michels raised this defense on appeal in TWN I by informing the Court of the
decision in the SLC Lawsuit, and its dispositive impact on this case, and by attaching to
their appeal brief a copy of the Summary Judgment Order. [See R. 1380 at 127-128; R.
1140 at 9, 19 n.10; Addendum F at 9, 19 n. 10.] This Court did not address that issue in
its opinion in TWN I.
On remand, the Michels again raised their res judicata defense. They argued that if
the trial court were to hold that Mr. Christenson owned the Property at the time he signed
the 1998 Deed to TWN, that ruling would be inconsistent with and contrary to the holding
of the court in the SLC Lawsuit. [R. 970.] At the conclusion of the trial, the Michels
moved for leave to amend the pleadings to formally plead the res judicata defense. [R.
1380 at 123; R. 1267 at 5-6.] The trial court rejected the Michel's argument, ruling that
this defense was not raised prior to the submission of the parties' summary judgment
motions and therefore was barred under the "law of the case" doctrine, was not raised in
the prior appeal, and was not an issue remanded by this Court in TWNL [R. 1302 at 6.]

-1 A-
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Mr. Christenson had intended to convey to Zions only his interest in the Property as
trustee of Cape Trust, and not his personal interest in the Property. The evidence
presented failed to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae.
The trial court committed reversible error in allowing Mr. Christensen to read his
Affidavit into evidence pursuant to the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay
rule, U.R.E. 803(5). The Affidavit was prepared fourteen years after the events set forth
therein took place, and therefore those events were not fresh in Mr. Christensen's memory
at the time the Affidavit was signed as a matter of law.
TWN claims that because the Michels did not object to the reading of the Affidavit
immediately prior to it being read, they waived the right to appeal the trial court's
decision on that issue. The record is clear, however, that the Michels objected to the
reading of the Affidavit when the request was first made, specifically arguing that the
Affidavit had not been made or adopted when the events referred to therein were fresh in
the witness5 memory, as required by Rule 803(5). [R. 1379 at 18.] In so doing, the
Michels preserved their right to appeal the trial court's ruling made thereafter, permitting
the reading of the Affidavit. Moreover, even if it were determined that the Michels were
required to object a second time to TWN's request that the witness be allowed to read the
Affidavit into the record, the evidentiary ruling still may be reviewed on appeal, because
in allowing the Affidavit to be read into evidence, the trial court committed plain error.
The trial court's ruling that Mr. Christensen intended in 1985 only to convey to
Zions his interest in the Property as trustee of the Cape Trust was based only on two items
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of e\ idence: (I) tl le c Dntent of the « \ffida\ it that was read into e\ idence and (2) the
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evidence, the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous, and the judgment in \\w ot nl
T W N should be reversed.
r

\ > s .!

:,

.ciusing iw , r.n.MviLi ..iv .'-I* iiv.1^ re^ judicata defense T^e

SLC Lawsuit, holding that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in :hi

:

-n.

The inal court also erred in i uline thai the Michcls did not raise their res judicata defense
•.Ma

ense was speciticaii\ iiwi^.,. in the Michels'brief on appeal. This

-17

Court did not address or dispose of that defense in TWNI. The trial court erred in failing
to rule that TWN's claim to be the owner of the Property was barred by res judicata.
The trial court erred in ruling that the Michels did not timely raise their defense
that the Tax Sale was invalid and that the Tax Deed was void ab initio. The trial court
erred in ruling that the invalid tax sale defense was disposed of on appeal in TWN I. The
trial court also erred in holding that this defense was barred by the statute of limitations
set forth in U.C.A. § 78-12-5.1 through -5.3.
A county does not have the authority to assess taxes against real property located
in another county. A county also lacks authority to hold a tax sale of property located in
another county upon non-payment of the assessed taxes. The sale of the Property by Utah
County at the 1984 Tax Sale was invalid as a matter of law because it involved the sale of
property located outside Utah County. The Tax Deed therefore was void ab initio, and
the trial court erred in refusing to invalidate the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THIS COURT'S
DIRECTIVE IN TWN I IN GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF TWN WHERE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DID NOT
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF DESCRIPTIO PERSONAE
A.

Under The Doctrine Of Descriptio Personam The Unexplained Use Of The
Word "Trustee" On A Deed Does Not Implicate Some Unspecified Trust
Interest But Operates As If The Word "Trustee" Were Not There,
In TWN I, this Court explained the doctrine of descriptio personae in the context

of a real property deed. Under this doctrine, the unexplained use of the word "trustee" on
a deed does not, absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust,
_1£_
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personal interest, they must be explicit and forthcoming about this intention if the) hope
to attain it." TIVN f i\\ n. 5 (emphasis added).
B.

Where Mr. Christenson Did Not Explain At Trial His Use Of The Word
"Trustee" After His Signature On The 1985 Deed To Zions, The Deed
Conveyed To Zions His Personal Interest Tn The Property,
. Mr. Christenson did not include on tin; 1985 IXvd *•
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should have indicated on the deed that he was SM:*''•••;•
entity. In failing to do so, the presumption of descriptio personae applies, and the 1985
Deed to Zions operates as if the "vv oi d "trustee" were not there. See TWNIdX 14,
In HVN I tlit* ( 'ourl stilt1*! thai altri n;ili\ v\\ ,i (mm I'. v\ ho signed a deed Ihal did
not show that it was being signed h\ \hr person only in his or her capacit) r as trustee for a
specific earned mi>i. but who clauns that he or she only intended to convey the interest of
a spc\. * 11 trust. "may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact,
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"explicit and forthcoming" about the person's intention in order to rebut the presumption
arising under the doctrine of descriptio personae. See TWN I at n. 5.
On remand, the trial court gave TWN the opportunity to present extrinsic evidence
to show that Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions was different
than it appeared on the face of the deed. TWN failed, however, to carry its burden of
presenting "explicit and forthcoming" evidence establishing that, in signing the 1985
Deed to Zions with the word "trustee" after his name, Mr. Christenson was intending to
convey only his interest in the Property as trustee of Cape Trust. Mr. Christensen testified
that he could not remember his intent at the time he signed the 1985 Deed to Zions, or the
capacity in which he intended to sign that deed. [R. 1379 at 22, 28; R. 1380 at 14.]
Given that testimony, and the lack of any other credible evidence in support of TWN's
position, the presumption of descriptio personae continues to apply, and the deed
operates as if the word "trustee" were not there. See TWNIat f 14. Thus, the trial court
should have entered judgment in favor of the Michels, as required by TWN I, and erred in
awarding judgment to TWN.
C.

The Trial Court Erred In Allowing Mr. Christenson To Read Into Evidence
The Contents Of His Affidavit.
1.

The Trial Court Erred In Allowing The Statements In The Affidavit To
Be Read Into Evidence As An Exception To The Hearsay Rule
Pursuant To The Recorded Recollection Exception.

Mr. Christenson was permitted to read into evidence at trial the Affidavit that he
signed shortly after he executed the 1998 Deed to TWN. The trial court ruled that the
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Affidavit was nol ..u.u.i \:\ ^.v ;. .\irsay rule pursuant to the recorded recollection
exceptioi 1 foi i

v

e I Jtal 1 R i lies of E\ idence R 1 ik 803(5) states:
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A memorandum 01 record concerning a matter about which a u nness MIS- e
had knowledge but n^w has insufficient recollection io enable the ^ itiu
to testify fully and accurately, shown lo ha\ e been made o ulwpied h\ ?
witness when the matter was fresh in the witnessf memory and to reflect
that knowledge correctly \ If admitted, the memorandum or record may be
read into evidence but may not itself be reeHv^! *•• <^ >>vK;Ht ij n |.^ ; s
^rtor.vi iv. .r. .ah ^rcjp partv.
U.R.E. 803(5) (emphasis added).
The Michels are not aware of any Utah appellate - <>ur t case that analyzes the
recorded recollection exception to the hearsay ml*

^ : decisions interpreting the

Evidence, vvhicli is identical iu kale 803(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, as well a^ Liie
views expressed in legal treatises on that hearsay exception, provide helpful insight into
the mannei in w 1: iicli the I Jtah rule sin ..<!.. ^ inierpietci. .i.iw upp..*. J.

recorded recolieciion exception, a showing is required that ^ ; Liu, vwuiess meiiior) ui the
events detailed in the memwi.mdmn i> -sufficiently impaired; (2) the witness prepared K
adopted the memorandum when the events were fi esh in the witness' memory ana t

of the events. See Bank of Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais, 168 F.Supp.2d 57, 62
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Fincher v. Cown(y of Westchester, 970 F.Supp. 989, 1005 (S.D.N.Y.
!'>")

i he phrase "when the matter was frc.,;-. •>

?i

:i,e u nness' memory* " in Rule 803(5)

has been interpreted by some courts to require that the memorandum be made or adopted
"at or near the time of the event," see Parker v. Reda, CO., 327 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir.
2003); or "contemporaneously with the event." Dickinson Supply, Inc. v. MontanaDakota Utilities Co., 423 F.2d 106, 109 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1970). Other courts do not apply
such a strict rule, but give appropriate consideration to all pertinent facts, including the
lapse of time, which reasonably and properly bear on the likelihood of the statement being
an accurate recordation of the event to which the memory related. See U.S. v. Senak, 527
F.2dl29, 141 (7th Cir. 1975).
In McCormick on Evidence at 714, § 301 (2d ed. 1972), it states:
The writing must have been prepared or recognized as correct at a time
close to the event. Some opinions use the older strict formulation that
requires Ihe writing to have been made or recognized as correct "at or near
the time" of the events recorded. This finds some support in psychological
research suggesting that a rapid rate of forgetting occurs within the first two
or three days following the observation of the event. But the tendency
seems to be towards acceptance of the formulation favored by Wigmore
which would require only that the writing be made or recognized at a time
when the events were fairly fresh in the mind of the witness. No precise
formula can be applied to determine whether this test has been met; perhaps
the best rule of thumb is that the requirement is not met if the time lapse is
such, under the circumstances, as to suggest that the writing is not likely to
be accurate.
Regardless of which standard the Court endorses, Mr. Christenson should not have
been allowed to read his Affidavit into evidence. The recorded recollection exception
does not apply unless the document was prepared or adopted when the matter was still
fresh in the witness' memory. See U.R.E. 803(5). In this case, it is clear that the large
amount of time that elapsed between the signing of the 1985 Deed to Zions and the
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will be more accurate than if it is prepared fourteen years after the matter took place.
Memories fade with the passage of time, and a person's ability to accurate]}' recall an
evei it years aftei it occi -* -•

suDstannany aimmi w.ev, ,j, ..»»ie; for a statemer* to h^

considered accurate and c11
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exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(5), it must have been made when the events
referred to therein were "fresh" in the witness' memory. See I J..R..E. 803(5).
The MiionuiL 101 mis rule is 10 insure the trustworthiness of the writing
embodying die recollection by inquiring thai it must have been clearly and
accurately remembered by the witness at the time of the making of the
writing, since the validity of the content of the writing is ordinarily not
subject lo "Hie test of Cross Examination 'on which our law places primary
reliance for the ascertainment of truth.'"
V \S. v /; MC Corp., 306 F.Supp 1106, 113 7 (E.D.Pa. 1969), quoting 3 Wigmore on
.Evidence, 74S ( |<>44 ml )

• *s < hristenson claimed he had a recollection ef his intent m signing the 1^8:
Deed to /ions at the time he signed the Affidavit, i N en \\ thai weio true, Rule 803(5)
does not apply to a document that is shown lo ha\e been made or adopted by tlv witness
when the matter was merely m the witness' memory. The rule requires that il K NIIOWU
that the document was made by the witness wher :h<* 'vnttrr "was fresh in the w Mies^
memory" U.R.li. 803(^0 <enniha<ds
-.uhh-r
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The purpose of the hearsay rule is to preclude a class of evidence considered to be
generally less reliable than in-person testimony of events observed by the testifying
witness. U.S. v. Hernandez, 333 F.3d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2003); 2 McCormick on
Evidence, § 245, at 93-96 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). Exceptions to the hearsay
rule have been created where certain types of documents or statements exhibit sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness to justify their admission into evidence. See generally
Hernandez, 333 F.3d at 1179; 2 McCormick on Evidence, § 253, at 126.
The requirement under Rule 803(5) that the document be made or adopted when
the matter is fresh in the witness' memory helps guarantee the trustworthiness of the
document sufficient to justify it being read into evidence. It also properly balances the
interests of both parties, and preserves the integrity of the judicial process. A witness
who no longer can recall an event referenced in a document prepared by the witness may
be permitted to read the document into evidence, thereby avoiding the hearsay rule, if the
statement was made when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory. If the document
was made years later, when the matter was not fresh in the witness' memory, the
trustworthiness of the document is diminished, and the justification to permit the
statement to be read into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule ceases to exist.
Mr. Christenson's Affidavit was not made at a time when the signing of the 1985
Deed to Zions was fresh in his memory. Thus, that statement is barred by the hearsay
rule, and the trial court should not have allowed the statement to have been read into
evidence as a hearsay exception under Rule 803(5).
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evidence, the judgment should be reversed.
2.

The Michels' Right To Have The Trial Court's Evidentiary Ruling
Under Rule 803(5) Reviewed On Appeal Was Preserved When Their
Attorney Objected To The Affidavit Being Read Into Evidence,

When TWN

;

read Hie Aiiidu. IL miu e\ idence pursuant lo the recorded recollection exceptio
hearsay rule, the Michels' attorney objected, arguinu tl»-:^ under Rule 803(5), TWN" had
to show filial the A i 1 ida\ it u was made or adopted b. m* witness when the matter was
fresl ! in the witi less' memoi ) ," ai id tl mt tl le i\ ffida j it "cer tainl> v\ asn't i nade at or aboi it
the time it was fresh in his mind." [R. 1379 at 18.] Following f u n l v -h ^ *••
the trial court and counsel, and voir dire of the witness, TWN's attorney again asked that
Mr Christen

be pei nutted to read the Affidavit into tl le record, and the trial court

granted that request. [R 1379 i it 23 ] I VI 1" I iioi., ai giies 1 1 latbecai ise tl le Michels'
attorney did not repeat his objection when TWN renewed its request to allow the w i t m ^
to read the Affidavit and the ii ial court granted the requeM. the Michels have waived the
juh
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• u\. iAt.u: , tii.ii^. I hat argument i^ -• iih-nt merit.
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An objection to the reading of the Affidavit was timely made on the ground that
the requirement for allowing the recorded recollection exception had not been met. The
Michels' attorney specifically stated that the Affidavit had not been made or adopted
when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory, and therefore the Affidavit could not
be read into evidence under Rule 803(5). The fact that he did not restate his objection
immediately prior to the reading of the Affidavit does not change the fact that a timely
objection was made, thereby preserving the Michels' right to appeal that ruling.
3.

The Court May Consider This Issue On Appeal Even If The Objection
Was Not Properly Made Where The Reading Of The Affidavit
Constitutes Plain Error.

Even if it is determined that the Michels should have repeated their objection to the
request to allow the witness to read the Affidavit at the time the trial court granted the
renewed request, that would not preclude this Court from reviewing the evidentiary ruling
on appeal. Although the general rule provides that an objection to the admission of
evidence is waived if not timely raised, an appellate court is not precluded from
considering the issue on appeal where the trial court committed plain error. State v.
Helmick, 2000 UT 70, f 9, 9 P.3d 164, 167. To establish plain error, it must be shown
that (i) error was made; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more favorable outcome was
reasonably likely. Id.
The elements required to establish plain error are present. An error was made in
allowing the Affidavit to be read into evidence, and that error should have been obvious

tin IIH" trial I (null

111 i rum vet ; liaimlul iiiili.il il piitudnl the basis lot the trial eouill's

erroneous decision. Had the Affidavit not been reml wU\ n ulem* i|n Mii'lrK ffTf;unI\'
would have had a more favorable outcome. That being the case, the trial court's ruling
constitutes plain error, and this Court is permitted to review that ruling on appeal.
4.

The Coiielinsory Statements In The Affidavit Do Not Constitute The
Type Of Extrinsic Evidence Necessary To Defeat The Presumption Of
Descriptio Personae.

In stating in TWNI that a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust
\vac intended, u^ \ ourt cited to the Supreme Court decision in BnUc Cascade Corp »,
y
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* "* - •

;

,sarenineu.a:. stating
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that the Supreme Court in Boise Cascade was "surest! ' i u e

unirr-,jMl,i

ould

have rebutted the presumptn »r of descriptio personae and shown thai luc descnpti\ c
language was iniended to bind the person in his representative capacity rather than in his
h

.. •.
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. and the trial court

on the reference to counter-affidavits in liaise (V/vi ade .ind m HI V
' / w as misplaced.
The trial =. • »urt ii i Boise Cascade granted summary judgment against a guarantor on
his written guaranty. The guarantor had argued that he was not personally liable because
he had placed tl ic « \ 01 d "^ 7 Pi z s " aftei 1 lis signati n : « :>i:i. tl le guaranty. In affirming the
trial court's grant of summary judgment, me Mipreme Court stated:
The terms of the guarantee are clear and unambiguous, and need m, paiol
evidence to clarify. The terms arc also understandable as to scope and
intention of the parties, and are of a dispositive nature It clearly is not coobligatory with the principal obligor. Stoncwood, Inn a promise standing
alone and apart. The "V-Pres." follow ing appellant's signature on the
agreenine ;. .P.IMM • .Ir^enp 1 *-^^ .*•.-»-;,*.;,, v M N n n a c \ ~.,f t .r t * ar;u
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bind a different principal obligor; otherwise the liability would result in an
absurdity, i.e., that the principal obligor also was the guarantor of his own
obligation.
The facts in this case are without dispute. Stonewood admittedly was
indebted to plaintiff. Appellant admittedly guaranteed its payment, and
there are no counter-affidavits that lend any doubt as to the fact of personal,
not representative, liability.
Boise Cascade, 655 P.2d at 669.
The court's reference in Boise Cascade to the lack of counter-affidavits was a
reference to the fact that the guarantor had failed to file any counter-affidavits in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. This statement did not establish a rule
of law that a grantor of a real property deed could defeat the presumption of descriptio
personae at trial through the use of a conclusory affidavit that lacks evidentiary
foundation and is not supported by admissible facts.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an affidavit supporting or opposing a
motion for summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth facts
that would be admissible in evidence, and must affirmatively show that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. See U.R.C.P. 56(e).4 An affidavit that
reflects merely the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions, conclusions or beliefs, lacks
evidentiary foundation, or fails to state admissible facts must be stricken. See Luckett v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 R2d 1373, 1380 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980).

"See also Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1979); Walker v. Rocky
Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 P.2d 538, 542 (1973); Western
States Thrift and Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 60, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972).
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Cape Trust. The Affidavit fails to provide, however, an)' evidentiary foundation or other
admissible facts to support that statement, The Affidavit provides no information to
suggest that Cape ' I i i ist 1 ic: Id an} interest in the Property at the time the 1985 Deed to

Cape Trust. It does not explain why he would have transferred to Zions only Cape
Trust's uitcrcst in the Property (which was nothing) when he had hought the Property at
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tax sale and then accept something less than Mr. Christenson s cntnc interest n* Jiu
Property in return It fails to explain how Mr. Chrisfensrn was protecting Zions' interest
in the IMupcil) h\ in onvcynij; (it /ions something less than his eniire interest in the
PropertA

11 (ml.1 hirsplam ss In, Mi < 'hiist'Mison \MMIM (i;nr hit, i nin|Mii;\ pun, base (lie

Property from Ziuiio m 1986 if Mr. Christenson already owned it.
Since the Affidavit lacked evidentiary foundation, was conclusory and self-serving
in iinlui'i", and ollict vvisr liulnl lo sadsly (lie requiremen: • -i ^.,k
errecj

n, .. ihi in<i court

j n allowing it to be read into evidence at trial Becai lse tl le statements ai e

insufficient as a mailer of law to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae, the trial
court's entry of judgment in favor of TWN based thereon constitutes reversible error.
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D.

The Trial Court's Ruling That Mr, Christenson Signed The 1985 Deed To
Zions Only As Trustee Of The Cape Trust Is Contrary To The Clear Weight
Of The Evidence And Is Clearly Erroneous.
Even if the trial court's action in allowing Mr. Christenson's Affidavit to be read

into evidence did not constitute reversible error, the conclusory statements in the
Affidavit are not dispositive on the issue of Mr. Christenson's intent when he signed the
1985 Deed to Zions. Indeed, the statements in the Affidavit are nothing more than
evidence to be considered. Moreover, where the statements in the Affidavit are
inconsistent with all of the other evidence presented on the issue of intent, the trial court's
ruling in reliance on the statements from the Affidavit was clearly erroneous.
When challenging a trial court's findings, "[a]n appellant must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ^j 15.
There were only two items of evidence that supported the trial court's finding that Mr.
Christensen intended in 1985 only to convey to Zions his interest in the Property as
trustee of the Cape Trust: (1) the content of the Affidavit that was read into evidence [R.
1379 at 24-25], and (2) Mr. Christenson's testimony that he would not have put the word
"trustee" next to his name on the 1985 Deed to Zions if he intended to transfer his
personal interest in the property. [R. 1362 at 4, ^ 19.] Basing its decision solely on these

-^0-

t wo itei ns of e\ idei ice, the trial coin fs n ilii i..g was against the cleai weight of the e\ idence
and. therefore clearly erroi leoi is :!)
The evidence on the intent issue establishes that Mr. Christenson did not believe or
understand what the statement in his Affidavit states - 'that in signing the 1985 Deed, to
Zions, he was intending to convey only 1 lis interest in the Property as trustee of Cape

protect Zions' interest in the Property, that he notified Zions of the action taken, and
offered to convey the Property back to the bank. Zions reimbursed Mr. Christenson for
the
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One year later, Mr. Christenson caused his cunip: — to purchase the Property from..
Zions for a large sum of money, and took, out a loan to d< • so. If Mr; Christenson had.
believ ed that he only had conv eyed Cape I r list s interest in the Property to Zions the year
before, and that ^
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Mr. Christenson's 1987 Financial Statement, which listed the significant assets
owned by him at that time, did not show the Property to be owned by him. Such evidence
further refutes the claim that Mr. Christenson did not intend to convey his personal
interest in the Property to Zions in 1985.
In 1996, Mr. Christenson filed the SLC Lawsuit against the Michels and others to
foreclose what he claimed was a beneficial interest in a contract right in the Property.
[Ex. 8 at 22.] He did not claim that he was the owner of the Property. Moreover, the
court in the SLC Lawsuit ultimately held that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or
interest to the Property, refuting TWN's claim that Mr. Christensen remained the owner
of the Property after he executed the 1985 Deed to Zions.
The Affidavit was signed shortly after the 1998 Deed to TWN was executed in an
obvious attempt to create for TWN a claim of ownership in the Property that otherwise
did not exist. The overwhelming evidence establishes, however, that Mr. Christenson did
not own the Property, and did not believe that he owned the Property, prior to the time
that he executed the 1998 Deed to TWN. The statement from the Affidavit that was read
into evidence is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and, if the statement from the
Affidavit were allowed to control over such other credible evidence, it would "result in an
absurdity." See Boise Cascade, 655 P.2d at 669. The trial court's ruling, based upon the
statements from the Affidavit, is clearly erroneous, and should be reversed by this Court.
The specific testimony upon which the trial court based its finding that Mr.
Christenson would not have put the word "trustee" next to his name on the 1985 Deed to

Zions if he intended to transfer his personal interest in the property does not support the
finding. Mr. Christenson simply testified that "we try to be specific as to what trust I'm
conveying (inaudible) signing it" and "You wouldn't put 'Trustee' in it if you were
signing (inaudible)." [R. 1379 at 39.] Where Mr. Christenson could not recall his intent
in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions, this vague, ambiguous and speculative testimony
about what he usually did or might have done does not constitute evidence sufficient to
refute the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
CONSIDER THE MICHELS' RES JUDICATA DEFENSE
The trial court ruled that it could not consider the Michels' res judicata defense
because this defense was not raised prior to the submission of the parties' motions for
summary judgment, and therefore was barred pursuant to the "law of the case" doctrine.
[R. 1303 at 6.] The trial court further rejected this defense on the grounds that it was not
raised or addressed in the prior appeal, and was not an issue that was remanded to the trial
court for decision. [R. 1303 at 6.] Those rulings were incorrect as a matter of law.
The res judicata defense did not exist, and therefore could not have been raised,
prior to the submission of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Oral
argument on the summary judgment motions was held on July 26, 2000. The trial court
ruled on the motions from the bench. The written Order reflecting that decision was
entered on August 24, 2000. [R. 240 at 1-2.]
The Summary Judgment Order entered in the SLC Lawsuit on August 3, 2000,
provides the basis for the res judicata defense. [R. 298.] This defense was raised on

September 28, 2000, in connection with the Michels' motion for reconsideration. [R.
338.] The Michels argued that TWN's claim of ownership to the Property was barred by
res judicata based on the Summary Judgment Order entered in the SLC Lawsuit. [R. 360
at 12-13.] TWN briefed the res judicata issue in its response to the reconsideration
motion. [R. 441 at 9-11.] The trial court denied the motion without addressing the res
judicata argument [R. 490 at 2], but the fact remains that this defense was raised by the
Michels once the Summary Judgment Order was entered.
The "law of the case" doctrine did not preclude the trial court from addressing the
Michels' res judicata defense. Under this doctrine, a decision made on an issue during
one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation. Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23,125, 70 P.3d 904, 912. This doctrine
has no application in this case because the trial court never ruled on the argument that
TWN's claim was barred by res judicata. [See R. 490 at 2.]
In their docketing statement in the prior appeal, the Michels did not specifically
identify the trial court's refusal to consider their res judicata defense as an issue for
review on appeal. The docketing statement notified the Court, however, of the Summary
Judgment Order in the SLC Lawsuit, and of the Michels' claim that this decision was res
judicata on the main issues in this case. [R. 1162 at 7.]
In their appeal brief, the Michels also informed the Court of the issue by stating:
In addition, a ruling in the related and pending Salt Lake Lawsuit
determined that Mr. Christenson had no interest in the Property at the time
of the Deed to Appellee in December 1998. The lower court's ruling is

1A_

inconsistent with prior court determinations affecting ownership of the
Property. [R. 1140 at 9; Addendum F at 9.]
A copy the Summary Judgment Order entered in the SLC Lawsuit was attached as
an addendum to the Michels' appeal brief, and other references to the ruling in the SLC
Lawsuit were made in that brief. [R. 1140 at 19 n. 10; Addendum F at 19 n. 10.]
The res judicata defense admittedly was not addressed by the Court in TWN/, but
it certainly was not rejected by the Court or disposed of on appeal. Instead, the Court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, based on the doctrine of descriptio
personae, and remanded the case to the trial court "for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion." TWN I at f 15.
Following remand, the Michels argued before, during and after trial that TWN's
action was barred by res judicata. [R. 975 at 6-8; R. 1380 at 117; R. 1267 at 3-8; R. 1296
at 1-3.] The Michels also sought leave to amend the pleadings to formally add that
defense. [R. 1380 at 123; R. 1267 at 5-6]. Nevertheless, the trial court refused to
consider it. [R. 1362 at 7, ^ 13.]
The absence of the res judicata defense in the pleadings or the trial court's refusal
to consider it does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue on appeal, particularly
where the parties briefed and argued the issue below and manifest injustice would
otherwise result. The Tenth Circuit has stated:
In general, we will decline to consider issues first raised on appeal. TeleCommunications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 1005, 1007 (10th Cir.
1993). This general waiver rule is not absolute, however, and "we may
depart from [it] in our discretion, particularly when we are presented with a
strictly legal question, the proper resolution of which is beyond doubt or
-35-

when manifest injustice would otherwise result." Daigle v. Shell Oil Co.,
972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992); see Tele-Communications, Inc., 12
F.3d at 1007 (one exception to general rule is "when the appellate court
feels it must resolve a question of law to prevent a miscarriage of justice.").
Although defendants have provided no explanation for why this issue was
not raised below, we nevertheless reach its merits because it has been
briefed fully by the parties and involves a pure legal issue . . . , and because
of the important public policy concerns raised by the issue . . . .").
Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1997).
The trial court's ruling that TWN is the owner of the Property totally contradicts
the ruling in the SLC Lawsuit that held that Mr. Christenson, TWN's predecessor-ininterest, had no right, title or interest in the Property. The issue created by this
inconsistent ruling needs to be addressed to prevent manifest injustice. Where this claim
was not addressed by this Court in TWN I, and clearly was raised and briefed in the trial
court, the trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to consider it, and that decision
should be reversed.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF TWN WHERE TWN'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP
OF THE PROPERTY WAS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct theories: claim preclusion and
issue preclusion. Buckner v. Kennard, 2000 UT 78, ^ 12, 399 P.3d 842, 846. Claim
preclusion involves the same parties or their privies and the same cause of action. It
precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that
were, in fact, litigated in the prior action. Id.6
6

In contrast, issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, arises from a
different cause of action and prevents parlies or their privies from relitigating facts and
issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first suit. Buckner, 2004 UT 78,
-16-

In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action, the party
asserting the defense must satisfy each of the following three requirements:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit
or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action.
Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2004 UT 93, f 20; 16 P.3d 1214, 1219.
All three elements necessary for the Michels' claim preclusion defense have been
established. First, the SLC Lawsuit and this action involve the same parties or their
privies. Mr. Christenson was the plaintiff in the SLC Lawsuit. TWN, which, claims title
to the Property by reason of the 1998 Deed to TWN that was executed by Mr.
Christenson, is Mr. Christenson's privy, and is the plaintiff in this action. The Michels
were defendants in both actions.
Second, TWN's claim of ownership to the Property in this action could and should
have been raised in the SLC Lawsuit. Mr. Christenson alleged in his Complaint in the
SLC Lawsuit that his interest in the Property was superior to that of the Michels and all
other defendants, and he sought to foreclose their interests in the Property. TWN claims
in this action that it is the owner of the Property and that the Michels have no valid
interest in the Property. Both claims seek a determination of the parties' respective right,
title and interest in the Property, and Mr. Christenson certainly could have, and clearly

(cont'd) Tf 12. In effect, once a party has had his or her day in court and lost, he or she
does not get a second chance to prevail on the same issues. Id.
-17.

should have, asserted any ownership interest that he claimed to have in the Property in the
SLC Lawsuit.
Third, the SLC Lawsuit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The Third
District Court entered summary judgment against Mr. Christenson, holding that he has no
right, title or interest in the Property. That Summary Judgment Order was a final order.
The Michels have established their claim preclusion defense as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court should set aside the judgment entered by the trial court on the
grounds that TWN's claim is barred under the claim preclusion doctrine.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
CONSIDER THE MICHELS9 DEFENSE THAT THE
1984 TAX SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS VOID
A.

The Michels Did Not Waive Their Right To Challenge The Validity Of The
1984 Tax Sale Based Upon Utah County's Sale Of Property Located In Salt
Lake County,
In its Complaint, TWN alleged that the Property was located in Utah County (and

not partially in Salt Lake County), and that title to the Property should be quieted in
TWN. TWN further alleged that the Tax Sale was valid and operated to extinguish any
and all rights, title and interest of any parlies claiming interest in the Property, including
Zions and the Michels, and that, because more than four years had elapsed since the Tax
Sale, any action or defense challenging the Tax Sale was barred by the four-year statute of
limitations contained in U.C.A. § 78-12-5.1 - 5.3. [R. 9 at 3,ffif9-11.] In their Answer,
the Michels admitted that more than four years had passed since the Tax Sale, but

generally denied that their challenge of the validity of the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed was
time-barred. [R. 13 atffif9-11.]
At the time the parties filed their cross motions for summary judgment, they still
erroneously believed that the Property was located entirely in Utah County. [See R. 158
at 2; R. 199 at 2, f 1, R. 235 at 2, ^ 3.] The trial court granted TWN's summary judgment
motion, subject to a determination on the Michels' adverse possession claim. By
September 2001, the Michels had learned that part of the Subject Property was located in
Salt Lake County, and therefore objected to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law submitted by TWN following the trial of the adverse possession claim on the basis
that part of the Property sold at Tax Sale was in Salt Lake County. [R. 668 at 2.] The
parties fully briefed the issue thereafter. [R. 752; R. 767; R. 778.] Nevertheless, the trial
court refused to consider the issue on the merits, ruling that the defense had not been
raised in a timely manner and, alternatively, was barred by the statute of limitations. [R.
785 at 2-3.]
The defense that the tax sale was void was not raised by the Michels in their
Answer because it was not known to the Michels (or to TWN) that part of the Property
sold by Utah County at the Tax Sale was located in Salt Lake County. The Michels raised
that defense prior to the entry of a final judgment, and TWN had full opportunity to brief
the matter. In view of these facts, the trial court erred in refusing to consider this defense
on its merits on the ground that the issue had not been raised in a timely manner.

B.

This Issue Was Not Disposed Of By This Court In The Prior Appeal.
In their first appeal, the Michels argued that the trial court erred in rejecting their

defense that the 1984 Tax Sale was void ab initio because Utah County did not have the
authority to sell at tax sale property located in another county. The Michels also argued
on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that this defense was barred by the statute of
limitations contained in § 78-12-5.1 - 5.3. [Addendum F at 19-26.]
Following remand, the Michels again asserted this defense. [R. 952 at 11-27; R.
975 at 8; R. 1380 at 123.] The trial court did not address the issue in its Ruling [R. 1303],
but apparently decided that this defense could not be raised because it had been decided
by the trial court prior to the first appeal, and was not an issue specifically remanded for
adjudication in TWNL [See R. 1361 at 7,113.]
This Court's decision in TWNI did not dispose of these issues. In that decision,
the Court expressly stated:
In addition to their principal argument in this case, Defendants argue that
we should deem Utah County's 1984 tax sale void ab initio because, as it
was discovered in about 1995, part of the parcel is in Salt Lake County. See
note 1, supra. Given our decision, we need not address this argument.

TWNIztSn/7.]
The Court did not address the issue of the validity of the 1984 Tax Sale in the prior
appeal. Given the fact that it was sending the case back to the trial court, it chose to defer
any ruling on this issue. Its decision to defer ruling on that issue does not mean that the
issue has been addressed or resolved.

Where an appellate court remands a trial court's decision for further proceedings,
determinations of law made at the appellate level become "law of the case" with respect
to further proceedings. See Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. ofUtah, 2001 UT 75, \ 9, 31
P.3d 543, 546. That principle does not apply in this situation, however, because this
Court did not rule on the issue in TWNL
The Court's statement at the conclusion of TWNI that "we reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion" did not dispose of the defense regarding the validity of the
1984 Tax Sale that had been raised by the Michels in the prior appeal. Accordingly, the
Court is warranted in addressing the trial court's refusal to consider this issue and in
ruling that the Michels' right to challenge the validity of the Tax Sale in 1984 is barred by
the statute of limitations.
C.

The Michels9 Invalid Tax Sale Defense Is Not Barred By The Statute Of
Limitations Contained in § 78-12-5.1 Through § 78-12- 5 3 .
The trial court determined that the four-year statute of limitations contained in

§ 78-12-5.1 through § 78-12-5.3 barred the Michels' defense that the Tax Sale was void
ab initio based on Utah County's lack of authority to sell property located in Salt Lake
County. The trial court made this decision even though it is undisputed that Utah County
and Salt Lake County did not learn until 1996 that part of the Property was in Salt Lake
County, and that the parties did not learn of it until 2001. For the reasons set forth below,
the trial court's ruling on this issue was incorrect, and should be overturned by the Court.
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1.

A County May Not Tax Or Sell At Tax Sale Real Property Located
Outside Its Boundaries.

Before addressing the statute of limitations issue, it is helpful to consider the
ultimate question of whether a county can actually tax and sell real property located in
another county, whether by mistake or otherwise. The statutes authorizing a county to
assess taxes against real property limit the property being taxed or sold to property located
"within the county."7 It is only this property that may be sold by the county at tax sale.
In the case of Baxter v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 783 P.2d 1045 (Utah App.
1989), this Court considered whether a county could validly sell at tax sale real property
not located within the boundaries of the county. Baxter, 783 P.2d at 1046-47. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT on the basis that the property in
question was actually located in Weber County, not Davis County. This Court reversed,
holding that the property actually was in Davis County and, therefore, the tax deed was
not invalid. Baxter, 783 P.2d at 1055. The Court did not rule that this challenge of the
validity of the tax sale, based upon the claim that Davis County had sold property outside
7

See, e.g., U.C.A. § 59-2-213 ("the [tax] commission shall prepare and furnish to
each county an assessment roll in which the county assessor of each county shall list all
property within the county") (emphasis added); U.C.A. § 59-2-301 ("the county assessor
shall assess all property located within the county which is not required by law to be
assessed by the commission") (emphasis added); U.C.A. § 59-2-303(1) ("prior to May 22
each year, the county assessor shall ascertain the names of the owners of all property
which is subject to taxation by the county ...") (emphasis added); U.C.A. § 59-2-325
("the county auditor shall, before November 1 of each year, prepare from the assessment
rolls of that year a statement showing the amount and value of all property in the county
. . .") (emphasis added); U.C.A. § 59-2-1001 ("the county board of equalization shall
adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within
the county . . . .") (emphasis added).
/to_

its boundaries, was barred by the statute of limitations contained in § 78-12-5.1 - 5.3.
Had the statute of limitations been a bar to the jurisdictional challenge asserted in Baxter,
the Court could have disposed of the case on that basis. It did not.
It is clear that at a tax sale, a county may not sell real property located in another
county. Such action would violate the express language of the applicable statutes, would
be contrary to the intent of the taxing system in effect in Utah, and would not be
statutorily or constitutionally permissible. Any sale of property located in another county
is jurisdictionally invalid.
In order for the Tax Deed issued by Utah County pertaining to the Property to be
valid, all of the property covered by the Tax Deed must be located in Utah County. Utah
County has no right or authority to sell property in an adjacent county, regardless of
whether such a sale is done intentionally or by mistake. Where the Tax Sale in question
involved the sale of property located in Salt Lake County, that sale is void ab initio, either
in its entirety or as to the portion of the real property located in Salt Lake County.
2.

The Statute Of Limitations Does Not Apply To A Jurisdictionally
Defective Tax Sale Of Property Located Outside The Boundaries Of
The County Conducting The Sale,

The trial court concluded that the Michels could not challenge the validity of the
1984 Tax Sale because of the four-year statute of limitations contained in U.C.A.
§ 78-12-5.1 through 5.3. That statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property
or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or
interposed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years
from the date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any
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county, or directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private tax
sale and after the expiration of one year from the date of this act. . . . "
U.C.A. § 78-12-5.2.
The term "tax title" . .. means any title to real property, whether
valid or not, which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale,
conveyance, or transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding
for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property whereby the
property is relieved from a tax lien.
U.C.A. § 78-12-5.3 (emphasis added).
TWN argued before the trial court that this statute bars any challenge to a tax sale
that is made more than four years after the sale, unless the challenger was in possession of
the property within four years of the date of the tax sale. It relied upon several Utah
cases which interpret this statute of limitations and bar untimely challenges to the
procedural or technical deficiencies involved in those case.8 None of those cases,
however, involved the sale by one county of property located in another county.
In Shelledy v. Lore, the Supreme Court quoted the general rule set forth in
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah 1981), that "tax purchasers may avail
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In Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 (Utah 1957), the defendant
asserted that certain statutory steps were not followed, such as "failure to attach an
auditor's affidavit to the assessment roll for the year the property was delinquent taxwise,
failure to acknowledge the instruments, etc." Id. at 360-61. In Frederiksen v. LaFleur,
632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981), plaintiffs contended that the tax purchasers' tax title was
invalid because the tax sale was conducted by an unqualified officer, whose appointment
as deputy county auditor was not made in writing and filed in the office of the Salt Lake
County Clerk and who had failed to take any oath of office as required by § 17-16-7." Id.
at 828. In Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), there were claims relating to the
prior owner's federal sovereign immunity. Id. at 787. All were rejected by the appeals
courts based on the statute of limitations.

themselves of the special statute of limitation regardless of either the invalidity of their
tax title or their inability to establish an affirmative claim to title apart from their tax
title." The court then specifically stated:
We expressly reserved voicing any opinion "on whether the special statute
of limitations could protect a tax title acquired by means repugnant to
fundamental fairness or whether such an application of the statute would
exceed the limits of statutory intent or constitutional permissibility. Id. at
831 n. 14.
Shelledy, 836 P.2d at 789.
Where Mr. Christenson's tax title was obtained through the sale by Utah County of
property located in Salt Lake County, the application of the statute of limitations to bar
the Michels' challenge as to the validity of the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed would "exceed
the limits of statutory intent or constitutional permissibility" and should not be allowed.
In Baxter, the plaintiffs sought to quiet title to the disputed property, basing their
claim of title on a 1969 tax deed from Davis County. The defendants challenged the 1969
tax sale on the ground that the property in question was located in Weber County at the
time of the sale. The Court noted the general principle as follows:
The strength and stability of title acquired by tax deed are aided . . . by the
four-year statute of limitations barring untimely affirmative actions or
defenses that challenge tax titles, [citations omitted], which applies even if
the tax title is invalid."
Baxter, 783 P.2d at 1047 n. 1.
Nevertheless, the Court did not dismiss the defendants5 challenge of the validity of
the tax sale on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred such a challenge, but

rather focused on the question of whether the property was or was not in the county that
had conducted the tax sale.
A defect in or a violation of the procedure that is required under the statutes when
conducting a tax sale is one thing. Statutes of limitation or repose may be enacted to
prevent delayed challenges based upon such procedural or technical deficiencies.
However, the sale of property not even located with the boundaries of the county that is
conducting the sale is an entirely different matter. The sale of such property is not
authorized by law, and therefore is void ab initio. Such a jurisdictional defect cannot
later be ignored or validated simply because the sale of the property located outside the
county's boundeiries was based on a good faith belief that the property was located
entirely with the county. Such a sale exceeds the statutory and constitutional authority of
the county, and violates due process.
Consider a hypothetical case where a county auditor in Juab County mistakenly
puts a legal description on a tax deed of property located in Washington County - more
than a hundred miles away from its correct location. The tax sale is held, the deed is
prepared and recorded, and no one is aware of the mistake for more than four years. The
property which was mistakenly "sold" is not developed, and no one has any reason to
know of the error. It cannot reasonably be argued that even though the property was not
in Juab County, even though the sale of the property was a mistake, even though no one
knew of the error and had no basis to object until long after the sale had taken place, and
even though Juab County lacked the authority to make the sale, because no challenge was

made to the sale within four years after the sale occurred, the statute of limitations bars
such a challenge. Such a result would frustrate the title system in the State of Utah,
would be contrary to the intent of the taxing statute, and would exceed the statutory or
constitutional powers of Juab County. To say that such a result would be unfair and
improper would be an understatement.9
In the case before the Court, the Michels acquired the Property in 1993 pursuant to
a foreclosure sale. At the time, no one had any reason to believe that the incorrect Tax
Sale by Utah County nine years earlier could conceivably impact that portion of the
Property located in Salt Lake County. Now, over a decade later, TWN argues that it has
title to the Property, including that portion of the property located in Salt Lake County,
because the passage of time somehow validates the improper sale in 1984 by Utah County
of property that was not part of Utah County.
This argument defies logic. It does not accomplish what the four-year statute of
limitations was designed to accomplish. It contradicts the express purpose of having
counties assess real property taxes on property located only in their respective counties,
which the property tax statutes and the Constitution simply do not allow.
9

The Legislature has determined that in cases requesting relief from "mistake," the
statute of limitations does not begin to run "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of
the facts constituting the . .. mistake." U.C.A. § 78-12-26(3). It was both unfair and
incorrect for the trial court to apply the statute of limitations in circumstances involving
the sale of real property located outside the county's boundaries until those claiming to
own the property discovered the facts giving rise to their invalid tax sale defense. In this
case, it was not known that part of the Property was located outside Utah County until
after the commencement of this litigation. Accordingly, the cited statute of limitations
should not be held to bar the Michels' challenge of the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed.

The statute of limitations in question expressly applies only to a "title to real
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is dependent upon any
sale, conveyance or transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the
liquidation of any tax levied against the property

" U.C.A. § 78-12-5.3 (emphasis

added). A county has no authority to sell at a tax sale property that is located outside of
its boundaries and any such sale cannot be considered "a statutory proceeding" within the
meaning of the statute. Such a defect is jurisdictional, the sale is void, and it is error to
apply the statute of limitations to a challenge to such a sale.
The trial court erred in ruling that the Michels are precluded from challenging the
validity of the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed based on the statute of limitations in § 78-125.1 - 5.3, and that ruling should be reversed.
3.

In Any Event The Language Of The Tax Deed Restricts Its Effect To
Property Actually Located In Utah County.

The Baxter case noted that the various deeds in question, after describing the
subject property in metes and bounds, also described that property as being "in Davis
County." That designation appears to have been important to the Court, as the remainder
of the opinion analyzes and determines the county in which the property actually was
located.
The language of the Tax Deed in this case indicates that the property sold at tax
sale was only that property lying within "Utah County." The Tax Deed recites:
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah,
Grantor, hereby conveys to RICHARD CHRISTENSON, Grantee, of 200
South Main #1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, State of Utah the following

described real estate in Utah County, State of Utah. [Ex. 1 (emphasis
added).]
The Tax Deed, by its express terms, limits the conveyance to property in Utah
County. The mistaken belief that all of the property lay in Utah County doesn't magically
make it so. It should be noted that the Tax Deed was not recorded in Salt Lake County illustrative that no one intended it to affect the Salt Lake County property.
Even if the Court should find that the current statute of limitations prohibits any
claim of invalidity of the Tax Sale or the Tax Deed, this Court is not prohibited from
making a ruling that the express language of the Tax Deed applies only to property in
Utah County. It was error for the trial court to ignore the language of the Tax Deed
restricting its scope and effect to the property located in Utah County.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Michels respectfully request that the Court reverse
the Judgment entered by the trial court, and enter judgment in favor of the Michels,
quieting title to the Property in the Michels.
DATED this 14th day of July, 2005.

ET*jice J. Nelson
NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN
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59-2-213. Duty to furnish assessment roll to counties.
(1) The commission shall prepare and furnish to each county an assessment roll in which the county
sssor of each county shall list all property within the county.
(2) In counties using computerized listings, the county assessor shall furnish the information required
ler Subsection (1) pursuant to procedures established by the commission.
tended by Chapter 3, 1988 General Session
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59-2-301. Assessment by county assessor.
The county assessor shall assess all property located within the county which is not required by law
>e assessed by the commission.
icted by Chapter 4, 1987 General Session
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59-2-303.1. Mandatory cyclical appraisals.
(1) Beginning January 1, 1994, each county assessor shall annually update property values of
perty as provided in Section 59-2-301 based on a systematic review of current market data. In
lition, the county assessor shall complete a detailed review of property characteristics for each
perty at least once every five years.
(a) The commission shall take corrective action if the commission determines that:
(i) a county assessor has not satisfactorily followed the current mass appraisal standards, as provided
law;
(ii) the sales-assessment ratio, coefficients of dispersion, or other statistical measures of appraisal
formance related to the studies required by Section 59-2-704 are not within the standards provided by
rov
(iii) the county assessor has failed to comply with the requirements of Subsection (1).
(b) For purposes of this section, "corrective action11 includes:
(i) factoring pursuant to Section 59-2-704;
(ii) notifying the state auditor that the county failed to comply with the requirements of this section;
(iii) filing a petition for a court order requiring a county to take action.
(2) (a) By July 1, 1993, each county assessor shall prepare a five-year plan to comply with the
uirements of Subsection (1).
(b) The plan shall be available in the county assessor's office for review by the public upon request.
(c) The plan shall be annually reviewed and revised as necessary.
lended by Chapter 271, 1995 General Session
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59-2-325. Statement transmitted to commission and state auditor.
The county auditor shall, before November 1 of each year, prepare from the assessment rolls of that
r a statement showing the amount and value of all property in the county, as classified by the county
essment rolls, and the value of each class; the total amount of taxes remitted by the county board of
lalization; the state's share of the taxes remitted; the county's share of the taxes remitted; the rate of
mty taxes; and any other information requested by the state auditor. The statement shall be made in
)licate, upon forms provided by the state auditor, and as soon as prepared shall be transmitted, one
>y to the state auditor and one copy to the commission.
lended by Chapter 86, 2000 General Session
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59-2-1001. County board of equalization - Public hearings — Hearing officers — Notice of
ision — Rulemaking.
^1) The county legislative body is the county board of equalization and the county auditor is the clerk
he county board of equalization.
(2) The county board of equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of the
[ and personal property within the county, subject to regulation and control by the commission as
scribed by law. The county board of equalization shall meet and hold public hearings each year to
mine the assessment roll and equalize the assessment of property in the county, including the
sssment for general taxes of all taxing entities located in the county.
(3) For the purpose of this chapter, the county board of equalization may appoint hearing officers for
purpose of examining applicants and witnesses. The hearing officers shall transmit their findings to
board, where a quorum shall be required for final action upon any application for exemption,
erral, reduction, or abatement.
(4) The clerk of the board of equalization shall notify the taxpayer, in writing, of any decision of the
ird. The decision shall include any adjustment in the amount of taxes due on the property resulting
tn a change in the taxable value and shall be considered the corrected tax notice.
(5) During the session of the board, the assessor or any deputy whose testimony is needed shall be
sent, and may make any statement or introduce and examine witnesses on questions before the board.
(6) The county board of equalization may make and enforce any rule which is consistent with statute
:ommission rule, and necessary for the government of the board, the preservation of order, and the
isaction of business.
lended by Chapter 227, 1993 General Session
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78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession within seven years — Proviso — Tax title.
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall be maintained, unless
plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed of such property within seven years from the
nmencement of such action; provided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses brought or
^rposed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the ownership of real property
inst the holder of a tax title to such property, no such action or defense shall be commenced or
rposed more than four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax
s unless the person commencing or interposing such action or defense or his predecessor has actually
upied or been in possession of such property within four years prior to the commencement or
^position of such action or defense or within one year from the effective date of this amendment.
Change Since 1953
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78-12-5.2, Holder of tax title — Limitations of action or defense — Proviso.
Nfo action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet title or determine the
lership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration
bur years from the date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly
my other purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and after the expiration of one year from
date of this act. Provided, however, that this section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner
he legal title to such property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in actual
session of such property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such action or
snse. And provided further, that this section shall not bar any defense by a city or town, to an action
the holder of a tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds a lien against such property which is
A or superior to the claim of the holder of such tax title.
Change Since 1953
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78-12-53. Definitions of "tax title" and "action."
;i) The term "tax title" as used in Section 78-12-5.2 and Section 59-2-1364, and the related amended
tions 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real property, whether valid or not, which
been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in the
rse of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property whereby the
perty is relieved from a tax lien.
[2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims and cross-complaints and all
il actions wherein affirmative relief is sought.
Lended by Chapter 4, 1987 General Session
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Uwe MICHEL, an individual; and Ullrich Michel, an individual, Defendants and
Appellants.
No.20010999-CA.
March 13, 2003.
Company to which quitclaim deed was executed, which occurred several years after the parcel
was apparently purchased by another party, brought action to quiet title. The Fourth District
Court, Provo Department, James R. Taylor, J., granted summary judgment for the company based
upon its belief that the original purchaser had acquired only trust interest in the property, which
actually did not exist. The original purchaser appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that
although the deed conveying the property to the original purchaser referred to the grantor as
"trustee," this unexplained reference did not mean the instrument conveyed only the grantor's
trust interest.
Reversed and remanded.
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Before JACKSON, P.J., and GREENWOOD, and ORME, JJ.

OPINION
ORME, Judge:
** 1 This appeal involves an action to quiet title to an eighty-three acre parcel of land that lies
along the border between Utah County and Salt Lake County. It turns on the sudden appearance
in a chain of title of * 1032 the term "trustee.11 We reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment and remand.

BACKGROUND
**2 As of 1984, Zions Bank was the record owner of the parcel at issue in this case. However,
Zions Bank became delinquent in paying its property taxes on the land, so Utah County sold the
parcel at a tax sale in 1984. [FN1] Richard Christenson purchased the property at the sale, and
accordingly he received title to the parcel. The grantee on the deed was listed as "Richard
Christenson.'1

FN1. Utah County sold the entire parcel, even the portion in Salt Lake County, because at the
time of the sale, it was thought the entire parcel was within Utah County. Not until
approximately 1995, when a new survey was conducted, was it discovered that part of the parcel
was actually in Salt Lake County.
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**3 In 1985, without any intervening transaction appearing of record, Mr. Christenson executed a
quitclaim deed to the parcel to Zions Bank, which reimbursed him the amount he paid at the tax
sale. The grantor was identified on that deed as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee." Zions Bank
sold the land to Franklin Financial, a corporation that was wholly owned by Mr. Christenson, in
1986. Zions Bank financed this sale, and when Franklin Financial defaulted on its mortgage
payments, Zions Bank held a foreclosure sale on the land. Defendants were the high bidders at
the foreclosure sale, which took place in 1993, and received an appropriate deed in due course.
**4 However, in 1998, Mr. Christenson executed another quitclaim deed for the parcel, this time
to Plaintiff. The grantor named on this deed was "Richard A. Christenson."
**5 In 1999, Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title on the parcel. Both sides moved for
summary judgment, and the trial court granted it in Plaintiffs favor. The trial court's order does
not explain the rationale underlying its decision. However, the parties agree that its rationale was
that because the 1985 deed to Zions Bank was signed "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee "
(emphasis added), the deed did not convey Mr. Christenson's personal interest in the property,
which was the interest he had acquired at the 1984 tax sale. Rather, as a matter of law the 1985
deed conveyed only whatever interest Mr. Christenson held on behalf of an unnamed trust, which
was apparently nothing. [FN2] Defendants now appeal the grant of summary judgment.

FN2. At oral argument both sides agreed that Mr. Christenson likely did not actually hold any
interest in the property on behalf of a trust. No explanation was offered as to why Mr.
Christenson would cause a corporation he owned to acquire title to the property from Zions Bank
for a considerable sum if he believed Zions had actually bought nothing from him and thus had
nothing to convey to the corporation.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] **6 "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because entitlement to summary
judgment is a question of law, we accord no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal
issues presented." Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1995)
(citations omitted). Thus, "[o]ur inquiry on review of a summary judgment is similar to the
inquiry conducted by the trial court: are there material issues of fact to be litigated, and did the
trial court correctly apply the governing law?" Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740
P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987).
**7 To determine whether "the trial court correctly appl[ied] the governing law" in this case, id.,
we must answer the following question: Does a grantor's unexplained placing of the word
"trustee" next to his or her name on a real property deed result, as a matter of law, in a
conveyance of only a trust interest? As explained below, we answer that question in the negative.
[FN3]

FN3. Lest the reader be tempted to view this as a "notice" case, wherein a subsequent bona fide
purchaser for value takes title if they record their deed first, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103
(2000), we clarify that such an issue is not present in this case. The disagreement in this case
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concerns what interest the 1985 deed conveyed-Mr. Christenson's entire interest or only his
"trustee" interest. No one
disputes that Defendants, who are the successors in interest to the first purchaser (Zions Bank)
and who properly recorded their deed, are the rightful owners of whatever interest the 1985 deed
conveyed.

* 1033 ANALYSIS
[2] **8 Although Defendants argue in general terms that the unexplained appearance of the
word "trustee" creates ambiguity on the face of the deed from Mr. Christenson to Zions Bank, the
thrust of their argument brings them within the doctrine known as "descriptio personae." This
term is defined as "the use of a word or phrase merely to identify or point out the person intended
and not as an intimation that the language in connection with which it occurs is to apply to him
only in the technical character which might appear to be indicated by the word." Dann v. Team
Bank, 788 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.App.1990). See also Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Peck, 195
Cal.App.3d 803, 240 Cal.Rptr. 911, 913 (1987) ("' "Where a writing in the nature of a contract is
signed by a person, and contains apt words to bind him personally, the fact that to such signature
is added such words as 'trustee,1 'agent,1 'treasurer,' 'president,' and the like does not change the
character of the person so signing, but is considered as merely descriptive of him."'") (quoting
Ricker v. B-W Acceptance Corp., 349 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir.1965) (quoting Ellis v. Stone, 21
N.M. 730, 158 P. 480, 483 (1916))); Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Down'Round Dev. Corp., 268
S.C. 80, 232 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1977) (defining "descriptio personae " as "a term descriptive of the
person rather than the relationship in which he signs the agreement"); 14 Richard R. Powell,
Powell on Real Property § 81A.04[l][a][iv][E], at 81A-42 (Michael Allan Wolfed., 2002)
(describing "descriptio personae " as "[c]ertain terms sometimes added to a person's name [that]
are merely descriptive matter intended to clarify the identity of the person, but... their use or
non-use should generally play no part in the validity of the conveyance").
**9 The Utah Supreme Court validated the descriptio personae concept for Utah courts in Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Development Corp., 655 P.2d 668 (Utah 1982). In that case, a
Stonewood corporate officer who had signed a loan guaranty agreement as "Vice President"
sought to absolve himself of personal liability on the guaranty agreement. He claimed that since
he had written the words "Vice President" next to his signature on the agreement, his signature
was in a representative capacity and bound only the corporation and not him personally. The trial
court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the creditor, and the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed. The Court held:
The "V-Pres." following [the officer's] signature on the agreement is a matter of description
(descriptio personae), not of capacity to bind a different principal obligor.... Stonewood
admittedly was indebted to Plaintiff. [The officer] admittedly guaranteed its payment, and there
are no counter-affidavits that lend any doubt as to the fact of personal, not representative,
liability.
Id. at 669. Accord Appliance & Heating Supply, Inc. v. Telaroli, 682 P.2d 867, 868 & n. 1 (Utah
1984). Utah courts have held similarly on other occasions as well. See, e.g., Proctor v. Insurance
Co., 714 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1986) (holding that an accident insurance company properly paid
decedent's second wife rather than his first wife because even though the second marriage was
illegal, the " 'designation [in the insurance policy] as the wife of insured is descriptive only, and it
-5-

is immaterial whether or not she is ... his lawful wife'") (quoting 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1160
(1946), which is updated with slightly different language at 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1419 (1993));
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485-86 (Utah 1975) (holding that a father's
divorce-decree mandate to name his "three minor children" as contingent beneficiaries in a life
insurance policy did not expire when the children reached adulthood because the "minor
children" designation "was merely descriptive of their status at the time [and] was not meant to
make them contingent beneficiaries only during their minority"); Southwick v. Leone (In re
Estate of Leone ), 860 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (holding that language identifying the
beneficiary of a pay-on-death account as the "spouse of the protected person" did *1034 not
create a condition precedent that the spouse remain married; rather, the phrase was "merely a
non- restrictive adjective phrase meant to identify the individual").
[3] ** 10 It has long been recognized that the concept of descriptio personae applies to the
identification of parties on real property deeds. See, e.g., Molina v. Ramirez, 15 Ariz. 249, 138 P.
17, 19(1914) ("The description of the grantor as the 'administratrix[ ]'... may be treated as
descriptio personam, and of no effect. She acted, so far as her interest in the property was
concerned, in her individual capacity when she executed the deed."); Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230
Iowa 730, 298 N.W. 895, 896-98 (Iowa 1941) (holding that the word "trustee" next to a grantee's
name on a deed was descriptio personae and citing various cases that held similarly); Owen v.
Ellis, 64 Mo. 77, 88 (1876) (holding that the word "executrix" appearing next to the grantor's
name was "mere descriptio personae, mere surplusage, and the conveyance would operate as well
without [it] as with [it]").
[4] ** 11 As for the question of whether the unexplained placement of the word "trustee" on a
real property deed may rightly be categorized as descriptio personae, almost every court that has
addressed this issue has addressed it in the context of the word appearing next to the grantee's
name, not the grantor's name as in our case. See, e.g., Hodgson, 298 N.W. at 895; Gammarino v.
Hamilton County Bd. of Revision, 84 Ohio St.3d 155, 702 N.E.2d 415,416 (1998) (per curiam).
Therefore, the question that most courts have confronted is whether the deed created a trust and
vested title in the grantee only as a trustee or whether it vested title in the grantee personally.
Such courts have almost universally held that the word "trustee," absent other circumstances,
does not create a trust, but rather constitutes descriptio personae and conveys title to the grantee
personally. See, e.g., Hodgson, 298 N.W. at 896-98; Gammarino, 702 N.E.2d at 417-18 (relying
partially on state statutory law but also on case law). See also Powell, supra, §
81 A.04[l][a][iv][F], at 81A-42 ("Most often the incidental and unexplained use of such terms as
'trustee' or 'agent' is ... considered to be merely descriptio personae and is insufficient to establish
or create a trust or agency."). But see Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp., 623 S.W.2d 942, 948
(Tex.App.1981) (holding that a deed created a trust, in part because the property was conveyed to
a named trustee but also because multiple extraneous factors so suggested).
[5] ** 12 The case at hand is slightly different from the opinions just cited because in our case it
is the grantor, not the grantee, who is designated as "trustee." However, this distinction is
immaterial. We see no logic in categorizing as descriptio personae the word "trustee" if it follows
a grantee's name but giving the word enforceable meaning if it follows a grantor's name.
Regardless of whose name the word follows, the principle must be the same: The unexplained
use of the word "trustee" on a real property deed does not, absent other circumstances suggesting
the creation or existence of a trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust interest. Therefore, in
both contexts, the deed should be read and interpreted as if the word "trustee" were not there.
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** 13 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, the only court of which we are aware that has
recently faced the precise issue that we face today, came to the same conclusion. In Terry v.
Zaffran, 483 So.2d 526 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), review denied, 492 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1986), a property
owner named Michael A. Taylor conveyed a parcel of land, signing the deed "Michael A. Taylor,
as trustee." Id. at 527. Title to the parcel followed a chain subsequent to that deed, and the land
was eventually mortgaged to appellant. Some months later, appellee obtained a judgment against
Taylor. Appellee then "became the grantee of a sheriffs deed issued pursuant to a levy on the
land to satisfy the judgment." Id. When appellee brought an action against appellant, the
mortgagee, to quiet title to the property, the trial court ruled in appellee's favor, holding that since
"Michael A. Taylor held title as an individual, the deed from him 'as trustee' was ineffectual to
convey title to the [first purchaser]." Id. Thus, the trial court held that Taylor's personal interest in
the property remained with him until appellee took it by virtue of the sheriffs deed. See id.
Predictably, the appellate court reversed and held as follows:
The addition of the words "as trustee" to the name of the grantor Michael A. Taylor *1035 was
merely "descriptio personae" of the person of the grantor and, as such, did not affect the validity
of the conveyance of the interest held by the grantor nor did it limit the estate conveyed. In
Florida today those words alone do not even charge a subsequent good faith purchaser or lender
with the duty to inquire as to the rights of undisclosed trust beneficiaries and can be safely
disregarded as surplusage. Accordingly, Michael A. Taylor having effectively conveyed all of his
interest in the land in question prior to the date of the judgment against him, that judgment never
became a lien on the land previously owned and conveyed by the judgment debtor. Thus, the
sheriffs deed was invalid and had no effect on the lien interest held by appellant as mortgagee.
Id. (footnote omitted).
[6] ** 14 Finally, we note that Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(5) (1993) authorizes a trustee to
dispose of trust property "in the name of the trustee as trustee." [FN4] In fact, that is exactly what
Plaintiff claims occurred in the present case. However, we hold that a trustee's intent to do so
must be made clearer than simply placing the unadorned word "trustee" after his or her name.
[FN5] A trustee-grantor should include on the deed such language as "in my capacity as trustee
for the XYZ trust." [FN6] Alternatively, as the Utah Supreme Court suggested in Boise Cascade
Corp., a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, intended. See 655
P.2d at 669 (suggesting that a counter-affidavit could have rebutted the presumption of descriptio
personae and shown that the descriptive language was intended to bind the person in his
representative capacity rather than in his individual capacity). Otherwise, the presumption of
descriptio personae will apply, and the deed will operate as if the word "trustee" were not there.

FN4. Although this subsection was not enacted until 1992, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402
amendment notes (1993), it is relevant to our decision today regarding the 1985 deed that Mr.
Christenson conveyed to Zions Bank. The subsection specifies that it "applies to a trustee's
exercise of trust powers both prior to and after the effective date of this subsection." Utah Code
Ann. §75-7-402(5) (1993).

FN5. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-409(2) (Supp.2002) provides: "If the terms of the trust are not
made public [in a grant of real property to a person as trustee], a conveyance from the trustee is
-7-

absolute in favor of purchasers for value who take the property without notice of the terms of the
trust." That statute is not directly applicable to the present case because this case does not involve
the situation anticipated by the statute, i.e., that "title to real property is granted to a person as
trustee." Id. § 75-7-409(1). Even so, our decision today is consistent with the statute's spirit:
When parties wish to convey a trust interest,
as opposed to a personal interest, they must be explicit and forthcoming about this intention if
they hope to attain it.

FN6. This phrase is intended only as an example of language that would be effective. We have
no intention of resurrecting the long-deceased requirement that certain, precise phrases must
appear on a deed to convey a particular interest. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-2 (2000) ("The term
'heirs,' or other technical words of inheritance or succession, are not requisite to transfer a fee in
real estate."); Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 354, 85 P.2d 861, 864 (1939) ("We are not interested
in the use of terms but we are in concepts, relationships and legal rights which for convenience
are often described by the use of legal names or expressions.").

CONCLUSION
**15 We hold that the word "trustee" appearing next to Mr. Christenson's name on the 1985 deed
to Zions Bank was not sufficient, by itself, to restrict the conveyance only to whatever interest
Mr. Christenson held in trust. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment
and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [FN7]

FN7. In addition to their principal argument in this case, Defendants argue that we should deem
Utah County's 1984 tax sale void ab initio because, as it was discovered in about 1995, part of
the parcel is in Salt Lake County. See note 1, supra. Given our decision, we need not address this
argument.

**16 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, Presiding Judge, and PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD, Judge.
UtahApp.,2003.
TWN, Inc. v. Michel
66 P.3d 1031, 469 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2003 UT App 70
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The above-entitled matter came on for trial before The Honorable Fred D. Howard, Judge
of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, on August 3 and 31, 2004,
upon remand from the Utah Court of Appeals (TWN, Inc. v. Michel. 2003 UT App 70, 66 P.3d
1031 (2003)). Plaintiff TWN, Inc. was represented by its counsel of record, Vincent C. Rampton
and Ross 1. Romero of Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, PC. Defendants Uwe and Ullrich
Michel were represented by their counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson of Nelson Christcnsen &
Helsten.
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The Court having heard the testimony of parties and witnesses, proffers of counsel,
having reviewed the file, pleadings and submittals, heard and considered argument of counsel,
and being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing, enters the following findings
of fact and conclusions of law, order, and judgment.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff TWN, Inc. is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in

Salt Lake City, Utah,
2.

Defendants Uwe ("Shaun") Michel and Ullrich {"OHie") Michel are individuals

and residents of the State of Utah.
3.

The real property which is the subject of this action consists of approximately 83

acres of land located in the area commonly known as Traverse Ridge, more particularly described
as follows:
COMMENCING at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast comer of the
Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet;
thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning.
("Subject Property \)
4.

As of 1984, Zions Bank was the record owner of the Subject Property,

5.

In 1984, however, Zions Bank became delinquent in paying its property taxes on

the Subject Property.
6.

In May of 1984, therefore, Utah County conducted an auditor's tax sale on the

Subject Property for delinquent taxes.

6698S3vl
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7.

The Subject Property was purchased at the tax sale by Richard A. Christenson as

the successful bidder.
8.

An Auditor's Tax Deed dated June 29, 1984, was issued and recorded with the

Utah County Recorder on July 18, 1984, as Entry No. 21303 in Book 2150 at Page 588,
9.

The named grantee on the 1984 Tax Deed was "Richard Christenson"; this

Richard Christenson and Richard A. Christenson are one and the same person, however.
10.

On September 12, 1985, without any intervening transaction appearing of record,

a March 19, 1985 Quit-Claim Deed describing the Subject Property and a separate parcel of
property in Salt Lake County, and naming Zions First National Bank as grantee, was recorded
with the Office of the Utah County Recorder as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405.
11.

The grantor on the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank was identified as

"Richard A. Christenson, trustee."
12.

Zions Bank then sold whatever interest it held in and to the Subject Property to

Franklin Financial in 1986, taking back a Trust Deed thereon.
13.

Franklin Financial thereafter defaulted on payments to the Zions Bank, resulting

in the conducting of a non-judicial foreclosure sale on April 13, 1993.
14.

Defendants Uwe and Ullrich Michel were the high bidders at the trustee sale.

15.

Defendants received a trustee's deed following the sale, which described both the

Subject Property and a separate parcel in Salt Lake County.

6698S3vl
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16.

Richard A. Chrisienson executed the March 19, 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, and

delivered the same to Zions Bank, in his capacity as trustee for Cape Trust, a trust of which he
was sole trustee.
17.

The purpose of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed was to transfer the interest, if any, of

Cape Trust in and to the property described in the Quit-Claim Deed, including the Subject
Property.
18.

It was not Mr. Christenson's intent or purpose, in executing the March 19, 1985

Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank, to convey any personal interest in and to the Subject Property,
as evidenced by the fact that the description on the Quit-Claim Deed includes other properties.
19.

The fact that Mr. Christenson executed the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank

in his capacity as trustee for the Cape Trust, rather than in his personal capacity, is further
indicated by the following:
a.

The content of an affidavit executed by Mr. Christenson and dated

January 14, 1999, wherein Mr. Christenson averred that he reviewed the 1985 Quit-Claim
Deed to Zions Bank, and that "he signed said Quit-Claim Deed as trustee for Cape Trust
to transfer the interest, if any, of Cape Trust in the Subject Property, and not any personal
interest in the Subject Property"; and
b.

Mr. Christenson's testimony in court that he would not have put the word

"trustee" next to his name on the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed if he intended to transfer his
personal interest in the property.
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20.

On December 9, 1998, Richard A. Christenson gave a Quit-Claim Deed to

Plaintiff TWN, Inc., describing the Subject Property, which was recorded in the Office of the
Utah County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No. 132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845.
21.

The 1998 Quit-Claim Deed was executed by Richard A. Christenson, with no

indication thereon that he was not conveying in his individual capacity.
22.

Mr. Christenson executed the December 8, 1998, Quit-Claim Deed with the

intent, and for the purpose, of conveying his personal interest in and to the Subject Property to
TWN, Inc.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-3-4.
2.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties as residents of the state of Utah.

3.

Venue is properly in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah Count)',

State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1.
4.

This matter was remanded for trial by the Utah Court of Appeals on the sole issue

of whether, in executing the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank as "Richard A. Christenson,
trustee", Richard A. Christenson intended to sign as trustee of the Trust, thereby intending to
convey the Trust's interest in the Subject Property, or whether he intended to convey his own
personal interest, adding the term "trustee" to his signature merely as descriptiopersonae.
5.

Under the Court of Appeals' ruling, a grantor's execution of an instrument of

conveyance as "trustee/' without further explanation, raises the presumption that the word
669SS3vl
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"trustee" was included merely as descriptio personae, and that the grantor is presumed to have
intended conveyance of his/her personal interest in the property being conveyed; however, this
presumption may be overcome either by identification, in the instrument of conveyance itself, of
the trust on behalf of which the conveyance occurs, or by other extrinsic evidence.
6,

As the Court is satisfied, based upon the evidence presented, that Richard A.

Chrislenson intended to execute the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed as trustee for Cape Trust, and that his
intent was to convey Cape Trust's interest in and to the Subject Property thereby, the
presumption of descriptio personae is overcome.
7,

As such, the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed conveyed to Zions First National Bank only

such interest as Cape Trust held in and to the Subject Property at that time.
8.

As of March 19, 1985, Cape Trust had no interest in and to the Subject Property;

rather, as of that time, fee simple title in and to the Subject Property was vested in Richard A.
Christenson, individually, by virtue of the 1984 Tax Deed.
9,

Title therefore remained vested in Richard A. Christenson, individually, until

Decembers, 1998.
10.

The Quit-Claim Deed executed by Mr. Christenson on that date, and delivered to

TWN, was sufficient to transfer title to the Subject Property from Mr. Christenson to TWN.
11.

Since December 8, 1998, fee simple title in and to the Subject Property has

remained vested in TWN.
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12.

Defendants Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel received no right, title, or interest in

and to the Subject Property pursuant to the April 13, 1993 Trustee's Deed from Zions First
National Bank.
13.

All issues of fact and law previously raised by the parties in this action, other than

those addressed above, have been resolved in this case by prior proceedings, were either
not challenged on appeal or were not included by the Court of Appeals as part of this Court's
mandate on remand, constitute law of the case, and need not be addressed again herein.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as on prior
proceedings in this case (including priorfindingsof fact and conclusions of law entered
following the first trial of this matter on March 27, 2001, partial summary judgment as entered
herein, and the ruling of the Court of Appeals referenced above), this Court enters the following
ORDER AND JUDGMENT:
1.

That title be and hereby is quieted in Plaintiff TWN, Inc. in and to the following

parcel of real property, located in Utah and Salt Lake Counties, State of Utah:
COMMENCING at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast comer of the
Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet;
thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning.
2.

That TWN, lnc.'s title to said property is held free and clear of any claim of right,

title, interest or encumbrance by or through Defendants Uwe Michel and/or Ullrich Michel.
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3.

That the lis pendens filed in connection with this litigation be and hereby is

released.
4.

That costs be awarded to Plaintiff TWN, lncM and against Defendants Uwe Michel

and Ullrich Michel, by separate ordei upon application by Plaintiff TWN, Inc. under Rule 54(d),
Utah R. Civ. P.. and that this judgment may be hereafter supplemented in accordance therewith.
5.

That the parties bear their respective attorneys' fees.

JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this &T2 day of Noysmber, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

^J&£ffi^

r

IJred D. Howard/District Judg<(

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
NELSON CHR1STENSEN & HELSTEN
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT^
FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAl

By:.

Bruce J Nelson
Attorneys for Defendants

DATE

22T1

Q±X5LL
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DEPUTY COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER AND JUDGMENT was hand
delivered this 15* day of November, 2004, to the following:

Bruce J. Nelson
Nelson, Rasmussen & Christensen
68 South Main, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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TWN, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case # 990402593

vs.

Judge Fred D. Howard

UWE MICHEL, an individual, and
ULLRICH MICHEL, an individual,

Division 5

Defendants.
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth
District Court Judge, on August 3 and 31, 2004. Originally, Judge Taylor granted summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, which was reversed and remanded by the Utah Court of Appeals. See
TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70,66 P.3d 1031. On remand, the sole factual issue before the
Court is whether, in executing the 1985 quitclaim deed to Zions Bank as "Richard A. Christenson,
Trustee," Mr. Christenson intended to sign as trustee of a trust, thereby intending to convey the
trust's interests in the subject property, or whether he intended to convey his own personal interest,
adding the term "trustee" to his signature merely as "descriptio personae." Other issues previously
raised by the parties have either been tried to this Court or rendered moot by the Court of Appeals'
decision.
The Court having heard the testimony of the parties, proffers of counsel, having reviewed
the file and pleadings, and being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing
therefrom, hereby issues the following:

BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff TWN, Inc. is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
City, Utah. Defendants Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel are individuals and residents of the State
of Utah. The real property which is the subject of this action (subject property) is primarily located
in Utah County, with a small portion in Salt Lake County, consisting of 83 acres. It was thought that
the entire parcel was within Utah County until 1995, when a new survey was conducted, it was
discovered that part of the parcel was actually in Salt Lake County.
As of 1984, Zions Bank was the record owner of the subject property at issue in this case.
However, Zions Bank became delinquent in paying its property taxes on the land, so Utah County
sold the subject property at a tax sale in 1984. Richard Christenson purchased the property at the
tax sale, and accordingly he received title to it. The grantee on the deed was listed as "Richard
Christenson."
In 1985, without any intervening transaction appearing on record, Mr. Christenson
executed a quitclaim deed to the subject property to Zions Bank, which reimbursed him the amount
he paid at the tax sale. The grantor was identified on that deed as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee."
Zions Bank sold their interest in the deed to Franklin Financial, a corporation that was wholly owned
by Mr. Christenson, in 1986. Zions Bank financed this sale, and when Franklin Financial defaulted
on its mortgage payment, Zions Bank held a foreclosure sale on the subject property. Defendants
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were the high bidders at the foreclosure sale, which took place in 1993, and received an appropriate
deed in due course.
In 1998, Mr. Christenson executed another quitclaim deed for the subject property, this
time to Plaintiff. The grantor named on this deed was "Richard A. Christenson." In 1999, Plaintiff
brought this action to quiet title on the subject property. Both sides moved for summary judgment,
and Judge Taylor granted it in Plaintiffs favor finding that the 1985 deed conveyed only whatever
interest Mr. Christenson held in behalf of an umiamed trust, which was apparently nothing. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a determination of Mr. Christenson's intent,
holding "that a trustee's intent to [dispose of trust property] must be made clearer than simply
placing the unadorned word 'trustee' after his or her name." TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at ^J14. The
Court of Appeals directed that intent can be shown by the trustor-grantor "including] on the deed
such language as 'in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ trust'" or by "resort[ing] to extrinsic
evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, intended." Id.
RULING
The Court notes that the sole issue before it is whether Mr. Christenson, in executing the
1985 quit-claim deed to Zions Bank as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee," intended to convey the
trust's interests or his personal interest in the subject property. See TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at ^f 15.
The Court of Appeals found that the "unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real property deed
does not, absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, create a trust or
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implicate only a trust interest." 7<i. atf 12. The Court of Appeals thenheld that a trustee may dispose
of trust property by including on the deed such language as "in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ
trust" or in the alternative, "a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact,
intended." Id. at \ 14. The Court of Appeals cited to Boise Cascade Corporation v. Stonewood
Development Corporation, 655 P.2d 668,669 (Utah 1982), wherein it was suggested that a counteraffidavit may be sufficient to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae by showing that the
descriptive language was intended to bind the person in his representative capacity rather than his
individual capacity. Id.
In citing Boise Cascade Corp., the Court of Appeals suggests that an affidavit explaining
the use of the term "trustee" may be sufficient to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae if the
affidavit shows that by using the term "Trustee," Mr. Christenson intended to restrict the conveyance
only to the interest he held in trust and that he retained any personal interest he held in the property.
At trial on remand, Plaintiff offered language from an affidavit of Mr. Christenson, signed
and dated January 14,1999, wherein Mr. Christenson averred that he reviewed the 1985 quit-claim
deed to Zions Bank, and that "he signed said Quit Claim Deed as Trustee for Cape Trust to transfer
the interest, if any, of Cape Trust in subject property, and not any personal interest in subject
property." Mr. Christenson testified that he could not recall the circumstances surrounding his
signing of the 1985 quit claim deed, but he testified that he was the sole trustee of Cape Trust and
that he would not have put the word "trustee" next to his name if he intended to transfer his personal
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interest in the subject property. Mr. Christenson also testified that it was not his custom to use
"trustee" unless he was signing as a trustee.
Defendants argued that Mr. Christenson's actions in a prior lawsuit, wherein he attempted
to foreclose a lien against the subject property but never claimed a personal interest in the property,
demonstrate that he had no remaining interest in the property. Considering the testimony of Mr.
Christenson and all the evidence before the Court, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendants'
argument.
Following the direction and mandate from the Court of Appeals, the Court finds that the
language of Mr. Christenson's affidavit and his testimony are dispositive of the issue as framed by
the Court of Appeals. The Court is persuaded by such evidence that he was acting on behalf of Cape
Trust when executing the quit claim deed. The evidence further proves that Mr. Christenson retained
any personal interest which he held in and to the property after execution of the 1985 quit claim deed
and that the only interest transferred in the quit claim deed was that of Cape Trust. Moreover, the
Court is persuaded by Mr. Christenson's testimony that he would not have signed as "trustee" unless
he was acting in behalf of Cape Trust.
The Court, therefore, finds that the proper and legal chain of title continued with Mr.
Christenson until 1998, when he conveyed his personal interest in the subject property to Plaintiff.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an order of this Court quieting title in and to the property, free
and clear of any claim of right, title or interest of Defendants.
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Defendants assert that Plaintiffs claim is barred by claim preclusion resulting from a final
order entered in the Third District Court. However, at the conclusion of the submission of the
parties' motion for summary judgment pleadings, the pleadings were closed as to such arguments;
and, therefore, pursuant to the "law of the case" doctrine, this Court is bound by previous decisions
in prior stages of this litigation. See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995). The
issue of claim preclusion not having been raised, the Court of Appeals did not address the issue and
remanded this case on the sole issue as outlined above. Respectfully, the Court will not, therefore,
reconsider this issue when Defendants should have previously raised it.
Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
an Order consistent with this Ruling.
Dated this f?^

day of November, 2004.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah. Appeals from final decisions can be made as a matter of right to the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)0 of the Utah Code Annotated. The Notice of Appeal was timely filed
with the Utah Supreme Court on December 5, 2001. On February 26, 2002, and pursuant to
§ 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme Court exercised its discretion to transfer
this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Was the trial court in error in refusing to consider parole evidence to interpret the
terms of an ambiguous Quit-Claim Deed? This is a question of law and should be
reviewed by this Court under a standard of "correctness".1

B.

May a county assess taxes on real property located in an adjacent county and hold a
tax sale following non-payment of the assessed taxes? This is a question of law and
should be reviewed by this Court under a standard of "correctness".2

C.

Was the trial court in error in applying a four-year statute of limitations to a
jurisdictional challenge to a Tax Deed issued by Utah County when mistakenly and
erroneously selling real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah? This is

1

Upon review of a summary judgment, this court will liberally construe the facts and view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants and against the plaintiff. Lucky Seven Rodeo
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988) No deference is accorded the trial court's
ruling and legal conclusions Transamenca Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc.,
789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990)
2

See footnote 1.
1

a question of law and should be reviewed by this Court under a standard of
"correctness" 3

RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to summary judgment is relevant to
the issues of this appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The underlying issue of this case is a determination of the actual owner of a tract of eightythree (83) acres of undeveloped real property located at the top of the mountain (sometimes known
as Traverse Ridge) between Draper and Highland cities The property lies partially in both Salt Lake
and Utah counties (Addendum G, R 755 )
Appellants acquired ownership of the property in 1993, having purchased the same at a
foreclosure sale held by Zions Bank Appellees claim ownership of the property pursuant to a 1998
Quit-Claim Deed from Richard A Christenson (Addendum C )
The root of titleflowsfromthe effect of a 1984 Tax Deed from Utah County following a tax
sale of the property (Addendum A )
On July 16,1999, Appelleefiledan Action to Quiet Title in the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County seeking a declaration of such court that Appellee was the owner of the property
under its 1998 Quit Claim Deed (R 9) Appellants defended the action by alleging their ownership
pursuant to the 1993 foreclosure sale and resulting Trustee's Deed (R 15, 326)

3

See footnote 1
2

The predominant issues in this case are: (1) whether the lower court should have considered
parole evidence to clarify the effect of an ambiguous or incomplete 1985 Quit Claim Deed executed
by "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" to Zions Bank and (2) the questioned validity of an
erroneous 1984 tax sale by Utah County, Utah County had mistakenly assessed and sold real property
actually located in Salt Lake County at the tax sale. In the lower court, Appellants asserted that the
1984 tax sale by Utah County of property located in Salt Lake County was jurisdictionally invalid.
(R. 767.)
At a hearing on cross-motions for Summary Judgment, the lower court refused, sua sponte,
to consider parole evidence to ascertain the true grantor of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, signed by
"Richard A. Christenson, Trustee". As a result, the court ruled that the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed
executed by Richard A. Christenson was invalid and that his 1998 Deed properly vested fee title to
the Property in the name of Appellee. (Addendum R)
The lower court further ruled, on summary judgment, that a four-year statute of limitations
on tax sales prohibited any review of the validity of the tax sale in 1984, holding that any mistake by
Utah County in assessing and selling Salt Lake County property was not "jurisdictional". (Addendum
H,R. 785.)
Appellants have appealed both rulings, asserting that the 1985 Quit Claim Deed was inherently
ambiguous on its face and requires parole evidence to clarify the real grantor thereof (R. 73.)
Accordingly, summary judgment was inappropriate because questions of fact exist as to the intention
of the grantor designation. Further, Appellants have appealed the lower court's ruling that the 1984
tax sale of Salt Lake County property by Utah County is inherently defective due to jurisdictional
defects. Accordingly, Appellants allege that the cited statute of limitations on tax sales is inapplicable
to these facts.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1

The real property ("Property") subject to this appeal consists of a parcel of

undeveloped land located in an area located between Draper and Alpine, Utah, sometimes known as
"Traverse Ridge" and more recently "South Mountain" (R 234 )
2.

In 1984, the record owner of the Property was Zions First National Bank (R 300,

3.

The Property consists of approximately 83 acres (R 234, 755, Addendum G ) The

366.)

Property is located partially in both Salt Lake and Utah Counties Of the Property, 77.224 acres is
located in Utah County and approximately six (6) acres of the Property is located in Salt Lake
County (Addendum G, R 755 )
4.

Prior to 1985, the Utah County Assessor mistakenly believed that all of the Property

was located in Utah County As a result, Utah County incorrectly assessed taxes on the entire parcel
of land, even though some of the Property was partially located in Salt Lake County (R 754,
Addendum G.)
5.

Due to delinquent taxes, Utah County scheduled the Property for tax sale to be held

in May 1984 (R 754, Addendum G )
6.

Richard A Christenson was an individual involved with the Traverse Mountain project

for many years - a project consisting of approximately 4,000 acres of land located adjacent to the
Property (R 234)
7

On the day of the scheduled tax sale, Mr Christenson discovered that the Property

owned by Zions Bank was scheduled for tax sale by Utah County Apparently, Zions Bank was
unaware of the sale (R 233, 315 )

4

8.

Mr. Christenson had a good relationship with Zions Bank due to prior business

dealings and wanted to protect the bank at the sale "because that is the type of relationship we felt
we had with Zions". (R 314.)
9.

Mr. Christenson purchased the Property at tax sale from Utah County for the sum of

$1,297.93. (R. 733, Addendum A.)
10.

Mr. Christenson later received a Tax Deed from Utah County. The grantee was

"Richard Christenson". Such Tax Deed was dated June 29,1984, and recorded in the office of the
Utah County Recorder on July 18,1984, as Entry No. 21303 in Book 2150 at Page 588. (Addendum
A, R.233).
11.

Mr. Christenson subsequently got reimbursed by Zions Bank for the monies advanced

at the tax sale. (R. 300, 351.)
12.

Mr. Christenson then executed a Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank. The Quit-Claim

Deed was dated March 19, 1985, and was recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder on
September 12, 1985, as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405. The grantor of the Quit-Claim
Deed was "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee". (Addendum B.)
13.

Zions Bank later sold the Property4 to Franklin Financial, a company wholly owned

by Mr Christenson. Zions Bank financed the purchase and took a Trust Deed to secure the same.
(R 297, 300, 305.)
14.

The obligations of Franklin Financial to Zions Bank later fell into default, and the

bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. At a foreclosure sale held on April 14,1993, Appellants were
the successful purchasers of the Property. (Addendum D.) An agent of Mr. Christenson attended

4

Other property not relevant to this case was included in the transaction.
5

the foreclosure sale, made an initial bid, and observed that the Appellants were the successful bidders.
(R. 298, 312.)
15.

As a result of the sale, Appellants received a Trustee's Deed dated April 14, 1993.

The Trustee's Deed was subsequently recorded in the offices of the Salt Lake and Utah County
Recorders. (Addendum D.)
16.

Since acquiring the Property in 1993, Appellants have treated the Property in all

respects as their own. (R, 132, 295.)
17.

Presumably because the Property was increasing rapidly in value and in order to add

it to other properties in the Traverse Mountain development, in March 1996, Mr. Christenson filed
a lawsuit in the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 960902187,
styled Richard A. Christenson v. Uwe Michel, et al (the "Salt Lake Lawsuit"). Mr. Christenson
sought to obtain the Property by foreclosing a purported 1978 Assignment of Contract in his favor
which he claimed encumbered the Property.5 (R. 309, 310.)
18.

During depositions in the Salt Lake Lawsuit, Mr. Christenson testified that he knew

of no interest he held in the Property, other than his Assignment of Contract interest. (R. 310, 311.)
19.

None of Mr. Christenson'sfinancialstatements of that period showed any ownership

interest in the Property. (R. 303, 318.)
20.

During the mid 1980's, Mr. Christenson held any interests he claimed in real estate in

various trusts he had established for holding ownership thereof. (R. 300.)

5

The property subject to such lawsuit included the Property subject to this action Over 200
defendants (R. 310) were named as parties to such action (Addendum E, R. 293). In the Salt Lake
Lawsuit, no claim was made that Mr. Christenson owned the Property, only that he claimed a lien
against the same.
6

21.

The Salt Lake Lawsuit was primarily funded for Mr. Christenson by his neighbor and

friend, Chuck Akerlow. Mr. Akerlow participated in decisions of strategy in the Salt Lake Lawsuit.
(R. 303.)
22.

After two and a half years of unsuccessful litigation by Mr. Christenson in the Salt

Lake Lawsuit, one or more members of Mr. Akerlow's family, among others, formed a new
corporation on December 7, 1998, known as TWN, Inc, the Appellee herein. (R. 357.) The next
day, on December 8,1998, Mr. Christenson signed a Quit-Claim Deed to the Property to TWN, Inc.
The grantor of the Quit-Claim Deed was "Richard A, Christenson". The Quit-Claim Deed was
later recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No.
132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845. (Addendum C.)
23.

Appellee then initiated this action in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County

on July 16,1999, seeking to quiet title to the Property pursuant to the December 8,1998, Quit-Claim
Deed. Appellee asserted that the 1985 Quit Claim Deed from Mr. Christenson to Zions Bank was
defective and failed to transfer Mr. Christenson's fee interest received from the earlier Tax Deed from
Utah County. (R. 9.)
24.

Appellants answered, asserting ownership of the Property by virtue of the Trustee's

Deed of April 14, 1993, asserting the validity of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed from Mr. Christenson to
Zions Bank from which Appellants' title descends. (R. 15, 326).
25.

Both Appellee and Appellants filed cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 46,

26.

At oral argument on July 26,2000, the lower court ruled that the parole evidence rule

62.)

prohibited the consideration of extrinsic evidence to clarify the intent of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed
from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee". Accordingly, this Court found that Richard Christenson

7

had never individually divested himself of the title acquired by virtue of the 1984 Tax Deed and that
title thereby transferred to Appellant pursuant to the 1998 Quit-Claim Deed from Mr Christenson
(Addendum E.)
27.

The parole evidence rule had not been raised, nor briefed, by either of the parties prior

to the hearing - the same being raised sua sponte by the Court His written Order was signed
August 3, 2000. (R. 356, Addendum F.)
28.

In the meantime, Judge David Young in the Salt Lake Lawsuit had ruled on June 2,

2000, that Mr. Christenson had no interest in the Property. His written Order was signed August 3,
2000. (Addendum E.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER PAROLE

EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET THE MEANING OF AN AMBIGUOUS OR INCOMPLETE DEED
The "parole evidence rule" provides that extrinsic evidence should not be used to alter or
amend the meaning of documents which are complete within the four corners of the document.
However, where documents are incomplete or ambiguous, parole evidence is appropriately
considered to clarify (but not alter) the intent of the document.
The document in question in this case is a 1985 Quit-Claim Deed executed by "Richard A
Christenson, Trustee". It is impossible to tell who the grantor is of such Deed. Parole evidence is
not only appropriate, but necessary, to clarify the incompleteness and ambiguity of the Deed.
The lower court improperly refused to consider parole evidence in this case Other courts in
similar situations have considered extrinsic evidence to ascertain the proper identity of the intended
grantor. Proffered parole evidence in this case conclusively proves the intent of the parties and does

8

not alter or amend the incomplete document. The lower court's refusal to consider parole evidence
resulted in a decision totally contrary to the intent of the Deed. It also had the effect of ignoring/
overruling fifteen (15) years' of real estate transactions affecting the Property.
The Court improperly granted Summary Judgment in favor of Appellee because questions of
fact exist in the case.
In addition, a ruling in the related and pending Salt Lake Lawsuit determined that Mr.
Christenson had no interest in the Property at the time of the Deed to Appellee in December 1998.
The lower court's ruling is inconsistent with prior court determinations affecting ownership of the
Property.
2.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

TO A JURISDICTIONALLY INVALID TAX SALE
A county may not tax, nor sell at tax sale, real property located in an adjacent county. Case
law is dispositive on this issue. Statutory authority also prohibits such a sale. Any such sale in
violation of such statutes and existing case law is jurisdictionally deficient and void ab initio.
The lower court erred in ruling that such a situation was not "jurisdictional" and that a fouryear statute of limitations period prevented Appellants from challenging the defective tax sale. The
tax sale, being held contrary to statute, is not a "statutory proceeding", and the cited statute of
limitations is not applicable. Alternatively, the statute of limitations should only start to accrue when
the "mistake" was discovered.
Finally, the language of the Tax Deed itself restricts its effect to property actually located in
Utah County. Any deed purportedly conveying property which lies in Salt Lake County is ineffective
and invalid.

ARGUMENT
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER
PAROLE EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET THE MEANING
OF AN AMBIGUOUS OR INCOMPLETE DEED
I.
GENERAL STATEMENT
OF
THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE
A.

General Rule.

The Utah Court of Appeals set forth the general rule disallowing parole evidence in construing
a deed when it said:
"When a deed is plain and unambiguous, 'parole evidence is not admissible to vary its
terms' " Gillmore v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995),
B.

Exceptions to General Rule in Case of Ambiguities in a Deed.

It is likewise understood that an ambiguous document, or deed, needs explanation which the
four corners of the document cannot provide In such cases, parole evidence is not only permitted
but expected. The following statements from Utah courts confirm such exception to the general rule*
" . . . when a contract provision is ambiguous because it is susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation due to uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or
other facial deficiencies, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the intent of the
parties" WiHard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah
1995) (emphasis added).
"Contract language may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms
used to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more
plausible meanings." Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d
1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis added).
"A nonintegrated contract may exist where the terms are not ambiguous, but the
nature of the agreement itself is unclear (citation omittedO Only when contract terms
are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a
motion for summary judgment." Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551
(Utah App. 1991) (emphasis added).
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"It is the general rule that if an agreement is ambiguous because of lack of clarity in
the meaning of particular terms, it is subject to parole evidence as to what the parties
intended with respect to those terms (citations omitted). We hold that that rule also
applies where the character of the written agreement itself is ambiguous even though
its specific terms are not ambiguous." Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Brothers
Constructions Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added).
"Note that although parole evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the clear and
unambiguous terms of an integrated contract, parole evidence is admissible to clarify
facial ambiguity.'5 UnionBankv. Swenson, 707P.2d 663,665 (Utah 1985) (emphasis
added).
"It is also well known that the intention of the parties to a conveyance is open to
interpretation only when the words used are ambiguous." Hartman v. Potter,
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added).
Utah courts have been consistent in allowing extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguous documents.6

n.
THE 1985 CHRISTENSON
QUIT-CLAIM DEED IS
AMBIGUOUS "ON ITS FACE"
The 1985 Quit-Claim Deedfrom"Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" is ambiguous on its face.
It cannot be determined who the grantor is from the document itself. What trust is Mr. Christenson
the trustee of? There is nothing on the Deed to answer that question.
During a 1998 deposition of Mr. Christenson in the related Salt Lake Lawsuit, he was asked
that very question (R. 301):
Q
A
Q

. . . what Td like to have you tell me is why did you sign it as trustee?
I can't answer that.
What were you the trustee of in the year 1985?

6

Although not relevant to real estate transactions, but for comparison, the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code has codified the parole evidence rule in commercial transactions at § 70 A-2-202,
Utah Code Annotated, evidencing the legislature's philosophy about parole evidence. Such statute
provides that "contracts . . . may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented . . . ( b ) by evidence of
consistent additional terms unless the courtfindsthe writing to have been intended also as a complete
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement" (emphasis added).
11

A

Well, the one thing that comes to mind is I was trustee of Cape Trust but I've
also been a trustee of a number of trusts, family and otherwise I can't answer
your question

Mr Christenson further testified (R 300)
Q
A

Other than your miscellaneous family trusts and Cape Trust, can you think of
any trust that you were a trustee of in 1985?
PTA Trust

From Mr Christenson himself, we know that he was the trustee of several trusts in 1985
How can one know from the Deed itself which trust, if any, he intended to be the grantor? Mr
Christenson, the man who signed the Deed, was then asked that very question, when he stated
(R 300)
Q

Can I tell from this document or can you help from looking at this document
if there's anything on it that will help me understand what trust it is you're
referring to when you say Richard A Christenson, Trustee?

A

No, I can't

The lower court ruled that the parole evidence rule prohibited the consideration of extrinsic
evidence to clarify the meaning of the incomplete or ambiguous grantor designation on the 1985 QuitClaim Deed, presumably finding that such designation was not incomplete, nor ambiguous 7 The
lower court declined to consider Mr Christenson's sworn deposition testimony from the Salt Lake
Lawsuit

7

The lower court's ruling was made in the face of contrary expert testimony An affidavit
of an experienced title examiner was submitted to the lower court (R 364), indicating that the grantor
description on the 1985 deed was incomplete and ambiguous from a title examination standpoint
The lower court apparently disagreed, or ignored, such expert opinion
12

m.
PAROLE EVIDENCE IS APPROPRIATE
TO CLARIFY AMBIGUITIES
IN THE 1985 CHRISTENSON
QUIT-CLAIM DEED
Inasmuch as the grantor of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed cannot be determined from the deed
itself, parole evidence is appropriate to clarify the intent of the Deed. As generally observed by one
commentator:
"Extrinsic evidence is generally admissible to identify the person or persons intended
to be designated by the name used for the grantor in a deed. Thus, extrinsic evidence
is admissible to identify a grantor who executed the deed under an assumed name..."
23 Am. Jr. 2d, Deeds, Section 40, page 103 (emphasis added).
Utah courts have stated in similar situations:
"As in all parole evidence cases, oral testimony may not be admitted to vary or
contradict the terms of a document; however, it is admissible to clarify the meaning
of ambiguous provisions. The turnout areas shown on the plats do not clearly or
obviously portray their purpose. It was therefore proper to admit evidence to clarify
the intended purposes and uses of these particular areas. The testimony did not
contradict or change anything depicted on the plat and was therefore not in violation
of the parole evidence rule." Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners1 Association,
656 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added).
In a similar case involving uncertainty of the grantor listed only as "trustee", a Missouri court
has said:
"The grantee designated in the deed was "Donald Penrod, Trustee." These words
created a latent ambiguity as they failed to designate beneficiaries of the trusts. In
resolving latent ambiguities in deeds, the intent of the parties, primarily that of the
grantor, is determinative and dispositive, which intent is determined, not only by the
terms of the deed itself, but by the surrounding circumstances and conditions as well."
Penrodv. Hemy, 706 S.W. 2d 537, 540 (Mo.App. 1986) (emphasis added).
"A latent ambiguity in the description of land in a deed or mortgage is an uncertainty
not appearing on the face of the instrument, but which is shown to exist for the first
time by matter outside the writing, when an attempt is made to apply the language to
the ground. Such an ambiguity, it is practically agreed by all the cases, may be
explained and removed by parole evidence; having been revealed by matter outside
the instrument, it may be removed in the same manner". Becker v. Workman,
530 S W.2d 3, 6 (Mo.App. 1975).
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"There appears to be no question that a latent ambiguity is presented with respect to
the intended grantee in the two quitclaim deeds It is said that 'a latent ambiguity
arises when the writing on its face appears clear and unambiguous, but there is some
collateral matter which makes the meaning uncertain'
And it is well established
that parole or other extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain or clarify a latent
ambiguity" Gibson v. Anderson, 92 So.2d 692, 694 (Ala 1956) (emphasis added)
In the instant case, the Tax Deed transferred title to "Richard Christenson" (Addendum A )
The 1985 Quit-Claim Deed was from "Richard A Christenson, Trustee" (Addendum B ) Finally,
the 1998 Quit-Claim Deed went from "Richard A_ Christenson". (Addendum C ) Usage of a middle
initial can also create an ambiguity which should be explained through parole evidence Another
court has held.
"The erroneous use of the middle initial 'J ' created a iatent ambiguity ' A latent
ambiguity is an uncertainty which does not appear on the face of the deed The
ambiguity is created by matters outside the writing An ambiguity of this nature may
be explained and thus removed by clear evidence " Kratzer v. Kratzer, 595 S W 2d
453, 455 (Mo App 1980) (emphasis added)
In the instant case, extrinsic evidence will not vary or contradict the deed It will solely clarify
what was intended by explaining a term that is ambiguous - either because it is an obvious ambiguity
or a latent ambiguity As explained by the Utah Supreme Court
"There was here no attempt to vary or contradict the terms of the deed The deed,
while conveying appurtenances as a matter of law, was nevertheless silent as to just
what the appurtenances were There was a latent ambiguity in the deed in this respect
which was a proper subject of explanation, even by parole testimony " Wade v.
Dorms, 173 P. 564, 565, 52 Utah 310 (1918) (emphasis added).
Or, as another Court has stated.
"If the true owner conveys by any name, the conveyance, as between the grantor and
grantee, will transfer title, and in all cases evidence aliunde the instrument is
admissible to identify the actual grantor The admission of such evidence does not
change the written instrument or add new terms to it, but merely fixes and applies
terms already contained in it" Walter v. Miller, 54 S E 125,127 (No Carolina 1905)
(emphasis added)
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Due to the ambiguous grantor designation contained in the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed ("Richard
A. Christenson, Trustee"), the court should consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the intent thereof
IV.
THE OBVIOUS INTENT OF
THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED WAS TO
DIVEST OWNERSHIP FROM
RICHARD A, CHRISTENSON8
By way of proffer of proof, Richard A. Christenson has explained on three separate occasions
what he intended in giving a deed to Zions Bank9:
In a 1987 deposition of Mr. Christenson in an unrelated case, he stated (R. 314, 315):
A

. . . Fm furnishing you an exhibit that shows the payables. And I noticed one
of those to Zions Bank for $284,000. That's a piece of property that Zions
financed for one of these Myron Child related investors. And Zions Bank had
neglected, they foreclosed on the property and neglected to pay the taxes on
it. We were at the sale and tried to reach Zions Bank and couldn't reach
anyone with the authorization. We paid the taxes, bought that property and
presented it to Zions and it's worth $284,000. But that is the kind of
relationship we felt we had with Zions. (Emphasis added.)

In a 1997 deposition of Mr. Christenson in the Salt Lake Lawsuit, he stated (R. 351):
A

. . . that we had picked up when one of our employees was at the Utah
County Courthouse at the time of the tax sale and we were making certain
that all of the taxes were paid on the full contract portion. That parcel was in
the name of Zions Bank solely and we tried to contact Mr. Noel Bennett. He
wasn't in. My employee, Mr. Merlin Hanks, had cashiers checks and I told
him to go ahead and to take care of the taxes which he did and we were later
reimbursed by Zions Bank and entered into a contract with them and that is
the parcel that you're referring to. (Emphasis added.)

8

It is more than obvious that Mr. Christenson believed he had transferred title pursuant to the
1985 Quit-Claim Deed and that he had no fee ownership of the Property because in 1996 he filed the
Salt Lake Lawsuit (Civil No 960902187) alleging a "lien", not fee title, against the Property
Nevertheless, his own testimony confirms such fact, as set forth in this section.
9

The lower court refused to consider the cited deposition testimony and further refused to
allow any discovery on this issue, believing the parole evidence rule "compelled" such result.
15

In a 1998 deposition of Mr. Christenson in the Salt Lake Lawsuit, he stated (R 299, 300)
Q

A

Does it refresh your memory at all to see the stamped verbiage at the top of
the page that when it's recorded it should go to [Zions] First National Bank?
Does that refresh your memory at all?
This one is, the only thing that comes to mind is we were concerned
sufficiently over the payment of property taxes on the property down there
that I sent Merlyn down to Utah County to monitor every parcel that he
thought could be under the Traverse Ridge mass description or the contract
and there was a parcel that was owned by Zions Bank and they had called out
the name and said it was being sold for taxes and Merlyn got in touch with me
and says what do I do? I tried to reach Noel Bennett at Zions Bank I
couldn't reach him and I said rather than letting it go through sale you've got
cashier's checks in different amounts, go ahead and pay the tax and we'll
settle up with Zions. That may have been tied into this. That's the only
recollection I have. (Emphasis added)

In the 1997 deposition, Mr. Christenson stated (R. 311, 312):
Q

A

Skip, I'd like to just briefly run through some of the things on discovery that
I previously propounded to make sure the answers are still accurate. In June
of 1996 I sent to your counsel a request for production of documents. I've
alluded generally to those responses but I need to make sure that I'm not
missing some documents. Thefirstrequest was I asked you to produce all the
documents that were previously recorded with the Salt Lake County and Utah
County Recorder to support your claim of an interest in the property and
again the only document that I received was Exhibit 1 [Assignment of
Contract]. Are there any other documents that you're aware that would
support your claim to an interest in this property other than Exhibit 1?
If there are I'm not aware of them

The arrangement with Zions Bank whereby Mr. Christenson purchased the Property to
protect the bank evidences an "escrow" or "trust" arrangement. This possibly explains why Mr.
Christenson may have chosen to deed the Property to the bank as "trustee". However, only parole
evidence can explain his intent. Summary judgment was improper with this question of fact before
the lower court.
It is obvious that Mr. Christenson believed he had divested himself of any individual interest
in the Property. Two years after executing the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank, Mr.
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Christenson produced his personal financial statement during his 1987 deposition. Such financial
statement did not list the Property as an asset. The following exchange took place (R 318):
Q

Skip, preliminarily I have been given by Zions First National Bank, with verbal
permission of your counsel, a copy of afinancialstatement dated March 31,
1987, which, while not signed, appears to have been prepared by yourself or
under your direction and I have several copies so I'll hand you a copy. I
suppose we ought to use that as a starting point, Skip, to ask you if this was
a statement which was prepared by yourself or under your direction on or
about March 31, 1987.
A
Yes.
Q
To the best of your knowledge does it contain an accurate statement of your
financial condition as of that day?
A
Yes(Emphasis added.)
Mr. Christenson also reconfirmed such statement during his 1998 deposition in the Salt Lake

Lawsuit (R. 302-3):

Q

Skip, I'd like to show you a document which has been marked as Exhibit 1 to
this deposition and as I represented to you off the record this was marked also
as Exhibit 1 to a deposition in which I took your deposition in 1987. I
represent to you that was a document which you provided to me. . . . I
represent to you it's a copy of a financial statement that you gave me ten or
eleven years ago dated March 31, 1987. While we were off the record you
had a chance to look at it. Do you recognize this document?
A
Yes.
Q
Is this a copy of your financial statement of March 31, 1987?
A
Yes.
Q
To the best of your knowledge and belief is it an accurate reflection of your
financial affairs as of that date?
A
I thought it was.
(Emphasis added.)
Parole evidence would easily show Mr. Christenson's intention to divest himself of any

ownership in the Property.
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SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST
WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE
The lower court granted Appellee summary judgment. Summary judgment may not be
granted when there exist genuine issues of material fact. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 (c). Upon review of
a summary judgment, this court will liberally construe the facts and view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the defendants and against the plaintiff. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp, v. Clark,
755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988) No deference is accorded the trial court's ruling and legal
conclusions. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah
1990).
There are substantial genuine issues of material fact that precluded the lower court from
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Without parole evidence to clarify the terms and
intention of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, it cannot be known: (1) Who is the grantor of the deed?
(2) What "trust" does Mr. Christenson seek to represent? (3) Is the "trust" a "revocable" trust which
would imply personal responsibility of Mr. Christenson? (4) Does the inclusion of the word
"Trustee" result from the acquisition of the Property at tax sale to protect Zions Bank - in an escrow
or trust type arrangement? The lower court cannot answer those questions without resort to extrinsic
evidence because the Deed is inherently ambiguous and incomplete.
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The issues of fact preclude summary judgment in favor of Appellee.

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING
A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO A
JURISDICTIONALLY-INVALID TAX SALE
L
A COUNTY MAY NOT TAX,
NOR SELL, REAL PROPERTY
LOCATED OUTSIDE ITS BOUNDARIES

A.

Utah Case Law is Dispositive on This Issue in Favor of Appellants.

Although it appears obvious that a county cannot tax real property outside its county nor
subsequently hold a tax sale on such property, Appellee argues that such an occurrence has given
Appellee title to certain property in Salt Lake County through a Tax Deed issued by Utah County.
Actually, Appellee does not necessarily argue that a county can validly undertake such action, only
that it is too late to raise the defect at this point in time due to a four-year statute of limitations found
in § 78-12-5.2 of the Utah Code Annotated. Such an argument is contrary to prior Utah case law.
The first issue before the Court, however, is whether a county can actually tax and sell real
property located in another county, whether by mistake or otherwise.

10

In addition to genuine issues of fact, Judge David Young had already verbally ruled (June
2, 2000) in the Salt Lake Lawsuit that Mr. Christenson had no interest in the Property. (Emphasis
added.) (Addendum E, R. 293.) "Accordingly, neither the Plaintiff [Richard A. Christenson], nor
any of the Defendants in this action, other than the four Michel Defendants, have any right title or
interest in and to the real property which is the subject of this action". Such ruling was later upheld
on appeal before this Court (Court of Appeals No. 20000781CA). It is acknowledged that the Salt
Lake Lawsuit dealt primarily with Mr. Christenson's claim to the Property through a 1978 document
and that Appellant was not directly a party to such action. However, agents or principals of
Appellant had funded and monitored the Salt Lake Lawsuit and were aware of its status. It is noted
that the fee ownership issue was never raised by Mr. Christenson during the four years of litigation
before Judge Young - an expected allegation if Mr. Christenson actually claimed ownership instead
of just a "lien".
19

In the potentially dispositive case of Baxter v. Utah Department of Transportation, 783 P. 2d
1045 (Utah 1989), the Court of Appeals considered whether a county could validly sell at tax sale
real property not located in its county. The court began its ruling.
This is a quiet title action to six acres of land in which defendant attached
plaintiffs' record title by challenging the title of plaintiffs' tax deed grantor, Davis
County, based on an allegation that the property lies in Weber County. Id at 1046.
***

As the basis for this claim, UDOT alleged that, because the property is located
in Weber County, Davis County had no authority to tax the property, to acquire title
when taxes were unpaid, or to convey title through a tax deed Id at 1047.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT on the basis that the property
in question was actually located in Weber County, not Davis County ("Thus, according to the trial
court, the subject six acres 'is and has always been in Weber County.'" Id at 1049.) The case is
interesting in that it dealt with a county boundary as defined by the channel of the Weber River - the
course of which had changed over the years.
The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the property actually lay in Davis County and that
the tax deed was, therefore, not invalid.
As evidenced by the Stipulated Facts (Addendum G, R. 755)filedwith the lower court, some
of the property allegedly sold at a Utah County tax sale is actually located in Salt Lake County. In
order for the Tax Deed to be valid as to such property, the property would have to be located in Utah
County. The Salt Lake County portion of the Property was taxed and sold under the mistaken view
that it was in Utah County. Accordingly, the tax sale, at least as to the property actually located in
Salt Lake County, was invalid.
B.

Statutory Authority Prohibits a Sale of Salt Lake County Land by Utah County.

All of the statutes authorizing a county to sell real property at tax sale limit the property sold
to that located "within the county" For example:
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Section 59-2-213 of the Utah Code Annotatedprovides that, u[T]he [tax] commission shall
prepare and furnish to each county an assessment roll in which the county assessor of each county
shall list all property within the county" (emphasis added.).
Section 59-2-301 states that, "[T]he county assessor shall assess all property located within
the county which is not required by law to be assessed by the commission" (emphasis added).
Section 59-2-303(1) provides that, "[Pjrior to May 22 each year, the county assessor shall
ascertain the names of the owners of all property which is subject to taxation by the county . . ."
(emphasis added).
Section 59-2-325 states that, "[T]he county auditor shall, before November 1 of each year,
prepare from the assessment rolls of that year a statement showing the amount and value of all
property in the county . . ." (emphasis added).
Section 59-2-1001 indicates that, "[T]he county board of equalization shall adjust and
equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within the county . . ."
(emphasis added).
Section 59-2-1351 sets forth the acceptable form of a notice of sale by the county. Such
section provides as follows:
"Notice is hereby given that on
(month/day/year), at
o'clock
.m., at the front door of the county courthouse in
County, Utah, I will
offer for sale at public auction and sell to the highest bidder for cash, under the
provisions of Section 59-2-135 LI, the following described real property located in
the county and now delinquent and subject to tax sale." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that at a tax sale, one county may not sell real property located in another county.
To find otherwise would be in violation of the express language of the applicable statutes, contrary
to Utah case law and against the intent of the taxing system in effect in Utah. Any sale in violation
of such rules of law is jurisdictionally invalid.
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EL
THE CITED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
DOES NOT APPLY TO A
JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE SALE
Appellee does not argue that a sale of Salt Lake County property by Utah County was proper.
Instead, Appellee argues that it is too late to raise the issue because of a four-year statute of
limitations on tax sales. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
"No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to
quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed
against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the
sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to any other
purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and after the expiration of one year
from the date of this act. .."
The term "tax title"
means any title to real property, whether valid or not,
which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or
transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any
tax levied against the property whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien.
(Emphasis added.)
Appellee argues that such statute renders moot any defense or challenge to the sale.
However, prior cases interpreting such statute of limitations relate only to technical challenges, rather
than jurisdictional defects that render the purported sale void, ab initio.
A.

The Sale was Void Ab Initio.

In Baxter, supra, the defendants challenged a 1969 tax sale. The court noted that the current
four-year statute of limitations was not enacted until after that 1969 sale. However, the court
observed that the earlier statute also made tax deeds "prima facie evidence of all proceedings
subsequent to the preliminary sale [to the county] and of the conveyance of the property to the
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grantee in fee simple." 783 P.2d at 1047, footnote l.11 Accordingly, the Baxter argument relating
to a limitations period is similar to argument under the current statute.
A defect in procedure of a tax sale is one thing. Statutes of repose may be enacted to prevent
later arguments about procedure, etc. The sale of property not even located in the county holding
the sale is an entirely different matter. The sale of such property is not authorized by law, was void
ab initio, and such jurisdictional defect cannot later be "validated" simply because of the mistaken
belief that the property was entirely located in Utah County. Such a concept violates due process.
Appellee should not be allowed to bootstrap an argument that the statute of limitations somehow
revives something that was never jurisdictionally proper to begin with.
Appellee argues that the statute does in fact render any defense moot. Appellants point out
the difference between "procedural" defects to a tax sale and fundamental "jurisdictional" issues that
rendered the sale void ab inito. It should be noted that each of the three cases cited by Appellant
uphold the statute of limitations argument for only technical or procedural defects.12
Consider a hypothetical case where a county auditor in Juab County mistakenly puts a legal
description on a tax deed of property located in Washington County - more than a hundred miles

1

The court did not rule on what effect, if any, the new statute of limitations would have on
the outcome of the case. The court, however, clearly aware of both the old and new statutes, did not
alter its implied conclusion that the tax deed would be invalid as to property not located in the county
holding the tax sale.
12

In Peterson v. Callister, 313 P.2d 814 (Utah 1957), defendant claimed tax sale defects such
as "failure to attach an auditor's affidavit to the assessment roll for the year the property was
delinquent taxwise, failure to acknowledge the instruments [tax deed], etc." In Frederiksen v.
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981), plaintiffs contended invalidity because "the tax sale was
conducted by an employee in the Salt Lake County Auditor's office whose appointment as deputy
county auditor was not made in writing andfiledin the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk and who
had failed to take any oath of office, as required by § 17-16-7". In Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786
(Utah 1992), there were claims of lack of notice of tax assessment to the property owner and other
claims invoking federal sovereign immunity claims. All were rejected by the appeals court due to the
statute of limitations issues.
23

away from its correct location. The tax sale was held, the deed prepared and recorded, and no one
was aware of the mistake for more than four years. The property which was mistakenly "sold" is not
developed, and no one had any reason to know of the error. Appellee would argue that even though
Juab County may have not had any jurisdiction over Washington County property, even though it was
a mistake, the sale was valid after four years because no one knew to object. Such a result would
frustrate the title system in the State of Utah and would be contrary to the intent of the taxing statute.
To say it would be unfair would be an understatement. However, a similar situation and result is
found in this case. The "mistake" was not in the legal description of the Property, but in that the
Property was not known at the time of the sale to be outside the county holding the sale.
Appellants herein acquired the Property in 1993 pursuant to a foreclosure sale. The Property
was located both in Salt Lake and Utah Counties. No one had any reason to believe that an incorrect
tax sale by Utah County nine years earlier could conceivably impact the Salt Lake County property.
Now, another nine years later, Appellant argues that it has title to the Salt Lake County property
because the passage of time somehow validates the improper 1984 tax sale of the Salt Lake County
property.
This argument defies logic. It does not accomplish what the four-year statute of limitations
was designed to accomplish. It contradicts the express purpose of having counties assess real
property taxes on property located only in their respective counties. To hold otherwise would allow
counties to affect title to properties in other counties.
B.

In Cases of "Mistake", the Statute of Limitations does not Accrue until

"Discovery" of the Mistake.
The legislature has determined that in cases requesting relief from "mistake", the statute of
limitations does not begin to run "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting
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the . . . mistake" (§ 78-12-26(3))13 It is error of the lower court to apply the asserted statute of
limitations in circumstances of a mistaken tax sale by Utah County until the owners discovered such
mistake. In this case, the Utah County error did not become known until after the commencement
of this litigation. Accordingly, the cited statute of limitations is not applicable.
C.

The Lower Court Erred in Finding that the Tax Sale Defect was not

Jurisdictional.
In its ruling, the lower court held that no tax sale may be challenged after expiration of the
four-year period in the above-cited statute of limitations. (Addendum H, R. 785.)
The language of the statute of limitations cited by Appellee (§ 78-12-5.3) expressly only
applies to ". . . any sale, conveyance or transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding
. . ." (emphasis added). Any tax sale held in violation of the statutes cannot be said to be "in the
course of a statutory proceeding" and such a defect is jurisdictional. Accordingly, it is error to apply
the statute of limitations to such a sale.
ffl.
IN ANY EVENT, THE TAX DEED LANGUAGE
RESTRICTS ITS EFFECT TO PROPERTY
ACTUALLY LOCATED IN UTAH COUNTY
The Baxter case, supra, noted that the various deeds in question, after describing the subject
property in metes and bounds, also described that property as being "in Davis County". Such
distinction appears to have been important to the court, as the remainder of the opinion addresses the
issue of the county in which the property was actually located.

Other statutes of limitation regarding waste and trespass to real property, certainly
analogous to this situation, also provide for a "discovery" requirement.
25

The language of the actual Tax Deed in this case (see Addendum "A") indicates that the
property sold at tax sale was only that property lying within "Utah County" The Tax Deed recites
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, Grantor,
hereby conveys to RICHARD CHRISTENSON, Grantee, of 200 South Mam #1200,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, State of Utah the following described real estate in Utah
County, State of Utah (emphasis added)
The Deed, by its express terms, limits the conveyance to property in Utah County The mistaken
belief that all of the property lay in Utah County doesn't magically make it so It should be noted that
the Tax Deed was not recorded in Salt Lake County - illustrative that no one intended it to affect the
Salt Lake County property.
To say that the Tax Deed also conveyed property in Salt Lake County violates not only the
intent of the taxing statutes but the express language of the Deed which limits its effect to property
located in Utah County
Even if the Court should find that the current statute of limitations prohibits any claim of
invalidity of the tax sale or resultant Deed, this Court is not prohibited from making a ruling that the
express language of the Deed applies only to property in Utah County It was error by the lower
court to ignore the effect of the language of the deed as restricting its effect to Utah County property

CONCLUSION
Any deed for which one cannot tell who is intended to be the grantor is inherently ambiguous
or incomplete Just as the parole evidence rule should not be used to alter or change the intent of a
document, it should also not be used to prohibit consideration of evidence clarifying the Deed's
intention To do otherwise in this circumstance would clearly condone something unintended by the
Deed itself and the circumstances surrounding execution of the Deed Substantial questions of fact
exist which make any summary judgment order inappropriate at this stage
26

It is not disputed that Utah County had no authority to sell real property located outside of
such county. The statute of limitations does not apply to the circumstances of this case. This
mistaken and erroneous tax sale is not "in the course of a statutory proceeding".
In addition, the Tax Deed itself restricts the property sold to that located in Utah County.
As a result, the sale was inapplicable to property actually located in Salt Lake County.
This Court should reverse the rulings of the lower court as outlined above.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of July, 2002.

NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
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ADDENDUM
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.

Tax Deed of June 29, 1984 (Utah County to Richard Christenson)
Quit-Claim Deed of March 19, 1985 (Richard A. Christenson, Trustee to Zions Bank)
Quit-Claim Deed of December 8, 1998 (Richard A. Christenson to TWN, Inc.)
Trustee's Deed Upon Sale of April 14, 1993 (Zions Bank to Michels)
Order of Summary Judgment of August 3, 2000 (Judge Young in Salt Lake Lawsuit)
Order of August 24, 2000 (Judge Taylor in Utah County lawsuit)
Stipulated Facts of October 4, 2001
Memorandum Decision and Order of November 8, 2001 (Judge Taylor)
§§ 78-12-5.2 and 5.3, Utah Code Annotated (Tax Sale Statute of Limitations)

ADDENDUM A
Tax Deed of June 29,1984
(Utah County to Richard Christenson)
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ADDENDUM B
Quit-Claim Deed of March 19,1985
(Richard A. Christenson, Trustee to Zions
Bank)

' j£P'

v

c

- '^~^

3
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO*
- _ „Z10NS FIRST NATIONAL BAN»C^ . —
z —.TZh
-PAN WAREHOUSE rxmiT^*
f*+ \ _

' L"*fcor» a ^ K E ^
at

8 A L T U X £ CrrY

. M. Fee Paxf |

ASSOCIATED TITLE
MISC. RECORDING

> WAH"S412S

-26380-

by

.Dep.1

Pi$e

ILrfcw^

r^s—& til

Addrtm.

Mail tax nooce tx>_

QUIT-CLAIM DEE

4065862

tlx^^l

R i c h a r d A. C h r i s t e n s o n , T r u s t e e
*»
jprt&tOC
of
S a l t Lake C i t y
, County of
S a l t Lake
, Stata of Utah, hereby
QUIT-CLAIM
to
Zions F i r s t National Bank, National A s s o c i a t i o n

grantee
for the nan of
DOLLARS,

of Salt Lake* City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah
TEN
and other good and valuable consideration
the following described tract of land in
Salt Lake and Utah
State oi Utah

R

v
V
\
^

County,

That portion of Lots 3 and 4, and the West half of the Southwest quarter of
Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, lying
with S*lt Lake County, and also lying within the following.

lo (COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10,
N JTownship 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
-^ <thance South 1320 feet thence West 3353.6 feet, thence North 1320 feet;
jthencc East 3353.6 feet to the point of beginnina.
il: •
* 1^ COMMENCING at a point West 197<» feet from the Northeast comer of the Northwest
k ,\ J quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Ba3e and
r '^ ^N-rjd'dn, and running thence South 2630.3 feet, thence West 1374.6 feet, thence
j\J vNorth 2630.3 feet thence East 1374 6 feet to the point of beginning.

H

V j

ii

WrrvEss the hand oi said grantor , this
19 th
March
, A. D one thousand nine hundred and e i g h t y
Signed in the presence of

d*y of
five.

)^L^/^^4
Trustee

STATE OF UTAH,
County of S a l t

Lake

On the
^
thousand nine hundred and

9 t h

85

Jay 0 £
March
personally appeared before me

A. D, one

,JRich.a£<T A.v C h r i s t e n a o n , T r u s t e e
the ugner of the foregoing uutnimait, who duly acknowledge to me that

- '
My commigiofl expires1 . $ - 1 2 - 8 7

Address* B o u n t i f u l ,

he

executed the

^ciryPuhfi£
Utah

TWN0017

£

ADDENDUM C
Quit-Claim Deed of December 8,1998
(Richard A.Christenson to TWN, Inc.)

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

CUT 1 " * P P 4 3 BK 4 9 0 4 PG 8 4 5 t
RANDALL A . COVINGTON
UTAH COUNTY RECORDER
1998 Dec 17 3:45 p. FEE 10.00 BY JRD
S D E D FOR FIRST AMERICAN TITLE CO

QUIT CLAIM DEED
Richard A. Christenson
, grantor,

of
Salt Lake City
QUIT-CLAIM(s) to

Salt Lake

, County of

State of Utah, hereby

TWN,Inc
, grantee,

of

Salt Lake City, Utah

for the sum of

ten dollars and other good and valuable consideration

the following described tracts(s) of land in
State of Utah:

Utah

DOLLARS,
County,

Commencing 1979 feet Westfromthe Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Rangel East Salt
.ake Base and Meridian; and running thense South 2630.3 feet; West 1374.6 feet; North 2630.3 feet; and East 1374.6 feet to the point of
beginning.

WITNESS the hand of said grantor(s), this

<f-r K

day of %^<jLrr^^ju^^

year/?^^

Signed in the presence of

c( - Q^j^I^x^g^^

^C^A^J

Richard A. Christenson

S T A T E O F : USLVl

^

COUNTY OF
On the

0

da

y°f

/hu>~ij\^

year *G*f
Richard A. Christenson

, personally appeared before me

, the signer of the within instrument, who
duly

ed to iH07ttR*mmS8ecut d the same.
KRLYNR. HANKS
111 Sod* Hal A*.
MUfctCiy.UT 84111

ADDENDUM D
Trustee's Deed Upon Sale of April 14,1993
(Zions Bank to Michels)

WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO J
Uve Michel
8 922 Cobble Crest Lane
Sandy, Utah 84093

t

3477649
1* APRIL 93
03152 Pfl
KATIE
L.
DIXON
RECORDERi SAuT LAKE COUNTYr UTAH
f O R I L L TITLE
REC BT: KAMA RANCHARD i DEPUTY

C5
TEPMM'g DIED PPOK tlLI
THIS INDENTURE, made April ?A, 1293, between SIOHS TIRST
KXTIOMXL BAKX, au the duly appointed Truitoe under the hereinafter
mentioned D^cd cf Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Trustee"), and
m m KICESL and ULLRICH KICHBL, as joint tenants with full rights of
survivorship, (hereinafter referred to as "Grantee").

W I T Nfc5 i
WHEREAS, TRA?rXLI!f 7IXHXC1XL, a Utah Corporation, by Deed of
Trust dated September 22, 1986, and recorded September 24, 1986, as
Entry No. 432C535, in Book 5820, Page 763, Said Trust Deed was also
recorded September 24, l.°36 as Entry No. 32147; in Book 2342, at
Page 346, in the Utah Courty Recorder's Office., of the official
records in whe office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake and Utah
County, Utah, did grant and convey to SIOHS TIRST KATIOKAL BJlM, a
national Association upon the Trusts therein expressed, the
property hereinafter described to secure, among other obligations,
payment of a certain promissory note and. inter^t, according to the
terms thereof, other sums of money advanced, and interest thereon;
and
WHEREAS, breach and default was made under the terms of said
Deed of Trust in the particulars set forth in the Notice of said
Breach of Default hereinafter referred to, to which reference is
hereby made, and
WHEREAS, IZOJfS JI^ST MATIOX7iL BAXX, the Beneficiary or holder
of said note, did make a D-sclar.'icion of Default and Demand for Sale
upon said Trustee, and thereafter there was filed for record on
November 23, 1992, in the office of the County Recorder of naid
County, a Notice of said Breach and Default and of Election to
cause Trustee to iell r;aid properties to satisfy the obligations
secured by said Deed of Trust, which Notice was duly recorded in
Book 6560 Page 0854, Said Notice of Default was also recorded in
Utah County on December 1, 1992, as Entry.No. 65853, in Book 3048,
at Page 901, of official records in said County, and
WHEREAS, Trustee in cor*aquence of said Declaration of
Default, Election, Demand for Sale, and in compliance with che
tsrms of said Deed of Trust, did execute its Notice of Trustue'u
Salt stating that it, as auch Truateo, by virtue of tho authority
in it vested, would s*ll at auction to the highest bidder for caah,

cn
en
CO
XJD

cn

in lawful money of the United States, the property particularly
therein and hereinafter described, said properties being in the
County of Salt Lake and Utah, State of Utah, and fixing the time
and place of sale as April 13, 1993, at the hour of 10:15 a.m., on
the front steps of the Courts Building (north side), 240 East 400
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, • nd did cause four copies of said
Notice to be posted for not leas than twenty days before the date
of sale therein fixed, as provided for under Section 57-1-25, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; and said Trustee did cause a copy
of said Notice to be published for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper having a general circulation in the County in which said
real property is situated, the last publication being at least ten
days, but not more than thirty days prior to said sale; and
WHEREAS, copies of said recorded Notice Default and of said
Notice of Sale were mailed in accordance with Section 57-1-26, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, to all those who were entitled to
special notice* of sale as in said Section provided; and
WHEREAS, all applicable statutory provisions of the State of
Utah and all of the provisions of said Deed of Trust have been
complied with as to acts to be performed and notices to be given;
and
WHEREAS, Trustee did at the time and place of sale fixed as
aforesaid, then and there sell at public auction to said Grantee,
XJTT& XICHEL, being the highest bidder therefore, the properties
hereinafter described, for good and valuable consideration.
NOW THEREFORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premises
recited and of the sum above mentioned bid and paid by the Grantee,
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and by virtue of the
authority vested in it by said Deed of Trust, does, by these
presents, GRANT AND CONVEY unto grantee, but without any covenant
or warranty, expresc or implied, all of those properties situate in
the County of Salt Lake and Utah, State of Utah, described as
follows:
PARCEL 1:
THAT PORTION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY LYING
WITHIN LOTS 3 AND 4 AtfD THE WEST ONE-HALF OF THE SOUTHWEST
QUARTER OF SECTION 10, SALT LAKE COUNTY:
COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF
SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1
SOUTH 1320 FEET; THENCE WEST 3353.6
FEET; THENCE EAST 3353.6 FEET TO THE

THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF
EAST, AND RUNNING THENCE
FEET; THENCE NORTH 1320
POINT OF BEGINNING.

TOGETHER WITH THAT PART OF LOTS 3 AIJD 4, SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP
4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, LYING IN UTAH COUNTY*

TOGETHER WITH ALL OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10,
SITUATED IN UTAH COUNTY, EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING:
A 50-FOOT STRIP AS DEEDED TO THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT,
THE CENTERLINE OF WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
COMMENCING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF SECTION 10, FROM
WHICH POINT THE NORTHKEST CORNER BEARS NORTH 5,078,2 FEET AND
WEST 2667.8 FEET; THENCE NORTH 30 DEGREES 30 MINUTE8 WEST
2829.7 FEET TO A POINT AND FROM WHICH POINT THE NORTHWEST
CORNER OF SAID SECTION 10 BEARS NORTH 2640 FEET AND WEST
3231.6 FEET.
LESS AND EXCEPTING: COMMENCING AT A POINT SOUTH 1320 FEET
FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION
10, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND
MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 1320 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO
A POINT ON THE SOUTH SECTION LINE OF SAID SECTION 10; THENCE
WEST ALONG THE SECTION LINE 3353.6 FEET; THENCE NORTH 1320
FEET, MORE OR LESS; THENCE EAST 3353.6 FEET TO THE POINT OF
BEGINNING.
PARCEL 2:
COMMENCING AT A POINT WEST 1979 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER
OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH,
RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH
2630.3 FEET; THENCE WEST 1374.6 FEET; THENCE NORTH 2630.3
FEET; THENCE EAST 1374.6 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
PARCEL 3:
COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF
SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE
MERIDIAN, RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 132 0 FEET; THENCE WEST 1 FOOT;
THENCE NORTH 1320 FEET; THENCE EAST 1 FOOT TO TKE POINT OF
BEGINNING.
PARCEL 4:
COMMENCING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 3, SECTION 10,
TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, RUNNING
THENCE WEST 118.8 FEET; THENCE NORTH 35 DEGREES 45 MINUTES
EAST 24.64 FEET; THENCE EAST 104.4 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 20 FEET
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
LESS AND EXCEPTING FROM PARCEL 1 AND PARCEL 3, THE FOLLOWING
DESCRIBED PROPERTY AS SET FORTH IN THAT CERTAIN PARTIAL DEED
OF RECONVEYANCE RECORDED JULY 13, 1990, AS ENTRY NO. 4940537,
IN BOOK 6236, AT PAS.* ,1085, SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S
OFFICE, AND AS RECORDS JULY 31, 1990, AS ENTRY NO, 24328, IN
BOOK 2 710, AT PAGE 2VJ, UTAH COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE TO KITt

THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10,
TOWNSHIP A SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, IN SALT LAKE AND UTAH COUNTIES
LESS AND EXCEPPING THE RIGHT OF INGRESS AND 2GZESS OVER, ABOVE
AND THROUGH THE ABOVE-DESCRIBF*} PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY.
IH WITNESS WHEREOF, said SIO»S TI5U5T KATIOXXL BAXX,
Trustee, has this day caused its name to be hereunto affixed.

as

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
in its capacity as Trustee

^^UA^^^K^
Gregory C. Taylor
Its: Vice President
by

STATE OF UTAH

)

COCJNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

The fore-going Trustee's Deed upon Sale was ac)cnowledged bofore
ma this 14th day of April, 1993, by GREGORY 0, TAYLOR, the Vice
President of ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ^^hrtrTCTTai Association.

NOTARY K7SLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing At:

ADDENDUM E
Order of Summary Judgment of
August 3,2000
(Judge Young in Salt Lake Lawsuit)

Bruce J. Nelsen (2380)
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN, PC
576 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone:
(801)531-8400
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
Facsimile:
(801) 363-3614
JUDGME
Attorneys for Defendants Michel
OFjyppMEfJTS
DATE

C 3 2000

Deputy Ctei*"

0»

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON,
Plaintiff,

UWE MICHEL and ANNETTE S. MICHEL,
husband and wife, and ULLRICH MICHEL
and CAROLA S. MICHEL, husband and wife,
as joint tenants; JAY V. BECK and FAYE E.
BECK, husband and wife, KENNETH J. BECK
and MARILYN BECK, husband and wife;
AFTON W. BULLOCK; GLADYS BECK;
SHIRLEY B. NASH; DAN C. SIMONS;
BECK LAND, INC., trustee; DAN C. SIMONS
EQUITY TRUST, DAN C. SIMONS
TRUSTEE, executed by BECK LAND, INC.,
a Utah Corporation; ALPINE, LTD., a Utah
Limited Partnership; KINGS SIX, INC., a
Utah Corporation; LAND WEST, INC., and
PARLEY BAKER; THOMAS E. SAWYER;
NEW EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; MYRON B. CHILD, JR.;
GEORGE GAWAN; BEC DEVELOPMENT,
INC,. W. K. ETHINGTON and ROLAYNE
ETHINGTON, his wife; B.E.C. DEVELOPMENT; DAVID V. PETERS and EDWARD A.
WHITE; FRANKLIN FINANCIAL, a Utah

ORDER OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 960902187
Judge David S. Young

IMAGED

Corporation, and NEW EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, a Partnership; M. B. CHILD AND
ASSOCIATES and MYRON B. CHILD,
individually; JACK M. STEVENS; JARRETT S.
JARVIS and PATRICIA Q. JARVIS; ESTES
HOMES, an Arizona general partnership; UTAH
PALISADES CORPORATION; ASSOCIATED
PROPERTY INVESTORS; DAN C. SIMONS
EQUITY TRUST, DAN C. SIMONS, Trustee;
PACE INDUSTRIAL CENTER; JUDY PACE
BILLINGS, as Trustee for the DAVID R. PACE
FAMILY TRUST; MICHAEL W. McBRIDE;
RICHARD F. McKEAN; D. CLARK BROWN and
RUSSELL W. CARRUTH; RICHARDS HAWKS
ASSOC; DAN C. SIMONS EQUITY TRUST,
a Family Estate c/o H. MARK SIMONS, trustee;
ELIN CHILD, aka ELIN S. CHILD; MARVIN R.
CURTIS, JR.; J. McDONALD BRUBAKER and
SCOTT M. BRUBAKER; CENTURY GENERAL
CORPORATION a Utah Corporation;
THEODORE D. GARFIELD, GARFIELD,
ASSOCIATES; GARNDER ENGINEERING;
OLYMPUS AERIAL SURVEYS INC.; GORDON
JOSEPH ANDERSON AND FRANCES JOYCE
ANDERSON; RAYMOND MALLORY;
CHARLES W. TAGGART, INVESTORS
COOPERATIVE, INC.; O.L. HOLEY (aka 0. L.
HOLLEY); MAX E. BAKER; R. R.
SCHEIDERIDER; DON I. HANSEN and
BARBARA HANSEN; BECK LAND, INC.,
trustee, ALPINE, LTD.; Notice of Federal Tax Lien
in the amount of $11,595.27 against CHARLES W.
TAGGART and in favor of the United States of
America; Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the
amount of $5,981.31 against CHARLES W.
TAGGART and in favor of the United States of
America; Lien of Judgment in favor of IHC
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah Corporation, d/b/a
CREDIT ASSURANCE AGENCY as Creditor
wherein ELIN CHILD and MYRON CHILD
appear as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in favor
of STANLEY BELNAP as Creditor wherein
2

MICHAEL W. McBRIDE and FIRST SECURITY ;
BANK OF IDAHO appears as Debtor; Lien of
Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein DAVID
BROWN appears as Debtor; Notice of Federal Tax ]
Lien in the amount of $38,288.40, against DANNY)
C. and SALLY J. SIMONS and in favor of the
United State of America; Lien of Judgment in
favor of DANNY J. JENSEN as Creditor wherein
MARVIN R. CURTIS, JR. and CURTIS TECH- ;
NOLOGIES, INC. appears as Debtor; Lien of
Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein CHARLES W.
TAGGART appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in
favor of ROBERT FEHR as Creditor wherein
MICHAEL McBRIDE appears as Debtor; Lien of
Judgment in favor of EMPIRE MILL & CABINET
as Creditor wherein KITCHEN DESIGN STUDIO
and DAVID BROWN, individually appears as
Debtor, dated December 15,1989 and entered
December 20, 1989; Lien of Judgment in favor of
STATE OF UTAH, by and through UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES as
Creditor wherein KENT BRENT BERRIEL appear
as and Defendant FRANCES ANDERSON aka
FRANCINE ZAMORE appears as PartyDefendant, dated December 27,1989; Lien of
Judgment in favor of FIRST SECURITY
FINANCIAL, a corporation as Creditor wherein
RICHARD McKEAN, et al. appear as Debtors;
Lien of Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein MARVIN R.
CURTIS, JR., JOHN C. CURTIS, JR. appear as
Debtors; Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the amount
of $50,599.04 against DAN C. SIMONS EQUITY
TRUST, ALTER EGO, NOMINEE, AGENT OR
TRANSFEREE OF DAN C. & SALLY J.
SIMONS and in favor of the United States of
America; Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the
amount of $50,599.04 against CHARLEMAGNE
TRUST, ALTER EGO, NOMINEE, AGENT OR
TRANSFEREE OF DAN C. & SALLY J. SIMONS
3

and in favor of the United States of America;
Notice of Federal Tax lien in the amount of
$38,288.40 against DAN C. & SALLY J.
SIMONS and in favor of the United States of
America; Lien of Judgment in favor of INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah
Corporation, d/b/a CREDIT ASSURANCE
AGENCY as Creditor wherein DWIGHT BROWN
and BEVERLY BROWN appear as Debtors;
Lien of Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein MARVIN
R. CURTIS, JR. and JOAN C. CURTIS, JR.,
appear as Debtors; Lien of Judgment in favor of
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor
wherein JOAN C. CURTIS, JR. and MARVIN R.
CURTIS, JR. appear as Debtors; Lien of Judgment
in the amount of $2,044.78 in favor of UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein
BARBARA HANSEN appears as Debtor, Lien of
Judgment in the amount of $2,859.32 in favor of
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor
wherein BARBARA HANSEN appears as
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of
$3,226.88 in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein BARBARA
HANSEN appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in
the amount of $3,666.56 in favor of the UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein
BARBARA HANSEN appears as Debtor; Lien of
Judgment in the amount of $2,632.45 in favor of
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor
wherein BARBARA HANSEN appears as Debtor,
Lien of Judgment in the amount of $2,555.59 in
favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as
Creditor wherein BARBARA HANSEN appear as
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of
$ 1,251.09 in favor of UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein DANIEL C.
BROWN appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in
the amount of $1,499.82 in favor of UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein DANIEL
C. BROWN appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment
4

in the amount of $1,752.42 in favor of UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein
DANIEL C. BROWN appears as Debtor; Lien of
Judgment in the amount of $ 1,345.45 in favor of
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor
whrein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as Debtor;
Lien of Judgment in the amount of $2,044.95 in
favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as
Creditor wherein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of $532.72
in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as
Creditor wherein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of $157.12
in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as
Creditor wherein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of
$2,760,00 in favor of PEAY RENTALS, TNC, as
Creditor wherein PARLEY BAKER appears as
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of $286.12
in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as
Creditor wherein JANET K. HANSEN and DON
HANSEN appear as Debtors; DENNIS BROWN
and VICKIE BROWN, Debtor; NEW EMPIRE
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation; MYRON S. CHILD, JR., JUDY
PACE BILLINGS, as Trustee for the DAVID K.
PACE FAMILY TRUST; RONALD S. COOK,
RAY W. LAMOREAUX, and WENDELL P.
HANSEN; PONDEROSA ASSOCIATES, a Utah
limited partnership Notice of Federal Lien in the
amount of $500.00, against RICHARDS HAWKS
ASSOC, JUDGE L. HAWKS, PTR, in favor of
the United States of America; Notice of Federal
Tax Lien in the amount of $510.00 against
DANIEL CLARK BROWN and in favor of the
United States of America; ALL AS IT APPLIES
TO THE PARCELS DESCRIBED HERETO AS
AN EXHIBIT,
Defendants.

5

Defendants Michels' Motion For Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the aboveentitled court on Friday, June 2, 2000. Bruce J. Nelson, Esq., was present and represented the
interests of Defendants Uwe Michel, Annette Michel, Carola Michel, and Ullrich Michel, the moving
parties. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq., was present and represented the interests of the Plaintiff
Richard A. Christenson. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and documents on file herein;
having found that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving parties are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law; having noted that the Plaintiff had no objection to the
granting of an Order of Summary Judgment; and the Court noting that all other Defendants have
either failed to respond or have filed Disclaimers of Interest in and to the real property which is the
subject of this action, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendants Michels' Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. Accordingly,

neither the Plaintiff, nor any of the Defendants in this action other than the four Michel Defendants,
have any right, title or interest in and to the real property which is the subject of this action. Such
real property is further described on the attached Exhibit "A".
DATED this

O - day ofJjity^OOO.
BY THE COURT

6

EXHIBIT "A"
THE LAND PARCEL 1: LOCATED IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH, AND
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
The surface rights only in and to the following described property; That part of Lot 1 and part of
the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian lying within Salt Lake County.
Commencing at point West 1979 feet from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of said
Section 15; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; thence North 2630.3
feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning.
THE LAND PARCEL 2: LOCATED IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH, AND
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
COMMENCING at a point North 00o17,13M East 1318.08 feet from the Southwest Corner of
Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South
89°52'00M West 96.23 feet; thence North 35°45,00" East 1187.25 feet; thence North 85°44W
East 732.71 feet; thence South 00°1718" East 1014.75 feet; thence South 89°52'00n West
1333.21 feet to the point of beginning.
THE LAND PARCEL 3: LOCATED IN THE COUNTIES OF UTAH and SALT LAKE,
STATE OF UTAH, AND DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
The surface rights only in and to the following described property: That portion of Lot 3 and the
West half of the Southwest quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, Salt Lake County, lying within the following described Tract: Commencing
at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 10; and running thence South
1320 feet; thence West 3353.6 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet to the point
of beginning.
Excepting therefrom all of the land heretofore conveyed to the Metropolitan Water District for
the purposes of Alpine Draper Aqueduct (Tunnel): a-50-foot-strip, the center line of which is
described as follows:
Commencing at a point on the South line of said Section 10, from which point the Northwest
corner bears North 5078.2 feet; thence North 30°30' West 2829.7 feet to a point and from which
point the Northwest corner of said Section 10 bears North 2640 feet and West 1281.6 feet.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of July, 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid to the following:

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. Esq.
Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070

J.
Bruce J. Nelson
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ADDENDUM F
Order of August 24,2000
(Judge Taylor in Utah County lawsuit)

FILED
Fourth Judicta! D-stnct Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968)
Ross I. Romero (USB #7771)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

f i t

Deputy

Attorneys for Plaintiff TWN, Inc.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TWN, INC., a Utah corporation,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 990402593

UWE MICHEL, an individual, and
ULLRICH MICHEL, an individual,

Honorable James Taylor

Defendants.

On July 26, 2000 at 2:30 p.m., TWN, Inc. ("Plaintiff), by and through its counsel of
record, Randall N. Skanchy and Ross I. Romero, and Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel
("Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson appeared at a hearing
held before the Honorable James Taylor, on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. At the hearing Plaintiff and Defendants,
455823vl

through counsel, made arguments in support of their motions. The Court having reviewed the
pleadings, heard argument and for other good cause shown,
ORDERED, that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, the Court however reserving to the Defendants sixty
days (60) from the date of this Order to conduct discovery on the sole issue of proof of
Defendants' claim of ownership of the disputed property by way of adverse possession. If
Defendants do not provide the Court with any additional evidence on the issue of adverse
possession at the end of sixty days (60), the Court will enter an Order granting Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment in full.
DATED this

QA

^ 0 INK

day of August, 2CK)

d

APPROVED AS TO FORM
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN

Bruce J. Nelson
Attorney for Defendants
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Randall N.SlcS
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / -^

day of August, 2000,1 cause to be hand

delivered, sent via facsimile a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following:
Bruce J. Nelson
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ADDENDUM G
Stipulated Facts of October 4,2001

vv I
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TWN, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATED FACTS

vs.
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and ULLRICH
MICHEL, an individual,

Civil No. 990402593
Judge James Taylor

Defendants.

The parties above-named, by and through their counsel of record, stipulate and agree to
the accuracy of the following facts without the necessity of submitting further evidence to
establish the same:
1.

Prior to 1984 (and thereafter until 1995), Utah County sent out tax billings on the

following parcel of real property (the "Property"). The Property serial number was B-324-A-B:
Commencing 1979 feet West from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter
of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and
running thence South 2603.3 feet; West 1374.6 feet; North 2630.3 feet; and East
1374.6 feet to the point of beginning.
2.

The Property consisted of 83 acres of undeveloped property which (unknown to

Utah County or Salt Lake County) was situated in both Salt Lake County and Utah County. The
majority of the Property was located in Utah County, and a minority of the Property was located

508854v2

11144.0001

in Salt Lake County. Due to survey errors corrected in or about 1995 (see Paragraph 8, below),
Utah County believed the Property to be located entirely within Utah County in 1984.
3.

Property taxes became delinquent from the billings issued by Utah County.

4.

In May of 1984, Utah County conducted an auditor's tax sale on the Property for

delinquent taxes.
5.

The Property was purchased at the tax sale by Richard Christenson. An Auditor's

Tax Deed dated June 29, 1984, was issued to Richard Christenson and recorded with the Utah
County Recorder on July 18, 1984, as Entry No. 21303 in Book 2150 at Page 588.
6.

On September 12, 1985, a March 19,1985, Quit-Claim Deed to the Property was

recorded from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" to Zions First National Bank. Zions First
National Bank had owned the Property prior to the tax sale. Such Quit-Claim Deed was recorded
with the office of the Utah County Recorder as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405.
7.

Utah County also assessed the Property in the 1985 and 1986 tax years.

8.

In 1995, pursuant to a survey conducted by the Utah and Salt Lake County

Surveyors' offices, it was determined that a portion of the Property was actually located in Salt
Lake County. Thereafter, and through the current time, Utah County has assessed only 77.224
acres of the Property and takes the position that such portion of the Property is located in Utah
County.

508854v2
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9.

TWN acquired its claimed interest in the Property pursuant to a Quit-Claim Deed

from Richard A. Christenson dated December 8, 1998, and recorded in the office of the Utah
County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No. 132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845.
DATED this *-f

day of October, 2001.

Vincent C. Rampton
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff

j

Ai

mice J. Nelson
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendants
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ADDENDUM H
Memorandum Decision and Order of
November 8,2001 (Judge Taylor)

Fourth Ju»i ca- f > : f ' r t Court
of Utah County. Stale ot Utah

//-?2U

</

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TWN, Inc. a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff

:
:

Memorandum Decision and Order

vs.

:

Date: November 8,2001

Uwe Michel, et. al,

:

Case Number: 990402593

:

Division V: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendant

This matter comes before the Court upon an issue raised following trial. Counsel have
submitted stipulated facts and have briefed the issue for the Court. The argument of the
Defendants is rejected.
Much of this case was decided, prior to trial, by summary judgment. This Court explicitly
determined all issues raised in the case except whether the Defendants could establish title by
adverse possession. Trial was held on March 27, 2001. Following the presentation of their case
on that point the Court ruled that they could not succeed on that point. The Court ossler-ed t h e ^
cam dismissed and directed counsel for the Plaintiff to prepare an appropriate order. Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but no order, were submitted and signed by the Court.
A motion for attorney fees was filed by the Plaintiff on April 10, 2001. The Defendant's
responded to the Motion for Fees on April 26, 2001 and, on May 3, 2001, asked the Court to
rule. On that same date the Defendants filed "Defendant's Objections to Proposed Findings and
Conclusions (Amended) Submitted April 25, 2001," The Court notes that amended proposed
Page 1 of
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findings were not submitted to the Court on April 25 although they probably were circulated to
counsel at about that time. It is in this objection that the Defendants, for the first time, formally
raised the issue now argued, that is, that a portion of the property conveyed in the tax deed of
1984 actually was located outside of Utah County. The Plaintiff responded to the objection and
the matter was set for oral argument on June 5, 2001. At the hearing the motion for attorney fees
was denied. The Court perceived that the parties were not in substantial disagreement as to
relevant facts on this issue but that they had different views of the law. Counsel were asked to
prepare a stipulated statement of fact and to submit more extensive briefs. Although that
procedure has taken some time, the briefing is now complete and the Court is ready to rule on the
issue.
The Plaintiffs argue, first of all, that the Defendants should not be entitled to bring this
new issue before the Court after summary judgment and trial on a narrow and different issue. The
Court has allowed the question to be heard because of the argument that the question was not
procedural but jurisdictional. Jurisdiction cannot be waived or created by stipulation.
Nevertheless, after considering the briefs and stipulated facts the Coun is saxisfied that this
question is not jurisdictional and that the Court did have jurisdiction to issue afinaljudgment as
ordered. The issue was not raised in a timely manner and should not, therefore, have been
considered.
The forgoing notwithstanding, the Court also rules, in the alternative, that the statute of
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limitations regarding tax deeds is plenary and bars the argument made in this case. Tax deeds are
meant to establish a title which can be absolutely relied upon once the four year statute of
limitations has passed Any deed executed and recorded on property similarly situated would
have appeared on the records of Utah County but not in Salt Lake County. There is no question
raised in the stipulated facts as to exactly what property was included within the tax deed
description, only the relationship between the property and the county line. The Court finds that
the statute of limitations with regard to tax deeds is intended to end any and all possible
challenges to such deeds The claim raised by the Defendants here is, therefore, barred.
An order incorporating this Court's conclusions as expressed in the findings executed on
April 3, 2001 has never been submitted to the Court The Court finds that such a further order
would be superfluous. The findings are hereby reaffirmed This case is di«»*$&sd by this order.
No further order need be submitted. This is intended to be thefinalruling of this Court on this
V? \NREO/ /y
matter.
Dated this 8th day of November, 2 0 0 0

Judge James R
Fourth Judicial District^

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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TWN v. tTWE 990402593 Memorandum Decision and Order 11/9/01
Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
Vincent C. Rampton
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Counsel for the Defendant:
Bruce J. Nelson
576 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
ih 84L62

XI

Mailed this |

day of

7h.
/ /

(LK

{ 2001, postage pre-paid as noted above.
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ADDENDUM I
§§ 78-12-5.2 and 5.3, Utah Code Annotated
(Tax Sale Statute of Limitations)

78-12-5.2. H o l d e r of t a x t i t l e — L i m i t a t i o n s of a c t i o n o r
defense — P r o v i s o .
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real
property or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof
shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax
title after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale,
conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or
directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private
tax sale and after the expiration of one year from the date of
this act. Provided, however, that this section shall not bar any
action or defense by the owner of the legal title to such
property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or
been in actual possession of such property within four years
from the commencement or interposition of such action or
defense. And provided further, that this section shall not bar
any defense by a city or town, to an action by the holder of a
tax title, to the effect t h a t such city or town holds a lien
against such property which is equal or superior to the claim
of the holder of such tax title.
1953
78-12-5.3. Definitions of " t a x t i t l e " a n d "action."
(1) The term "tax title" as used in Section 78-12-5.2 and
Section 59-2-1364, and the related amended Sections 78-12-5,
78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real property,
whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is
dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property
in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of
any tax levied against the property whereby the property is
relieved from a tax lien.
(2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes
counterclaims and cross-complaints and all civil actions
wherein affirmative relief is sought.
1987

ADDENDUM G
Time Line of Relevant Dates and Events

TIME LINE OF RELEVANT DATES AND EVENTS
Date

Event

May 1984

Property purchased by Mr. Christenson at tax sale. [R. R.
1380 at 9.]

June 1984

Tax Deed from Utah County to Mr. Christenson. [Ex. 1.]

March 1985

Quitclaim Deed from Mr. Christenson to Zions Bank ["1985
Deed to Zions"]. [Ex.2.]
Warranty Deed from Zions Bank to Franklin Financial. [Ex.
5.]

September 1986

September 1986

Trust Deed from Franklin Financial, as Trustor, with Zions
Bank, as beneficiary. [Ex. 6.]

March. 1987

Mr. Christenson's Financial Statement dated March 31, 1987.
[Ex. 10.]

April 1993

Trustee's Deed to the Michels. [Ex. 4.]

March 1996

Mr. Christenson filed his Complaint in the SLC Lawsuit to
foreclose a beneficial interest in the Property. [Ex. 8.]

December 1998

Quitclaim Deed from Mr. Christenson to TWN. [Ex. 3.]

January 1999
July 1999
August 2000

Mr. Christenson signed the Affidavit that was read into
evidence at trial.
This action was commenced. [R. 9.]
Order of Summary Judgment entered in the SLC Lawsuit,
holding that Mr. Christenson has no right, title or interest in
the Property. [Ex. 9.]

August 2000

Summary Judgment entered in favor of TWN and against the
Michels in this action.

March 2003

The decision in TWN I was issued by the Court.

August 2004

The trial of this action was held following remand.

ADDENDUM H
Summary of Evidence Supporting and
Contradicting TWN's Claim That Mr.
Christenson, in Signing the 1985 Deed to
Zions with the Word "Trustee" After His
Name, Intended Only to Convey His Interest
in the Property as Trustee of Cape Trust

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTING AND CONTRADICTING
TWN'S CLAIM THAT MR CHRISTENSON, IN SIGNING
THE 1985 DEED TO ZIONS WITH THE WORD "TRUSTEE"
AFTER HIS NAME, INTENDED ONLY TO CONVEY HIS
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AS TRUSTEE OF CAPE TRUST

Evidence Supporting The Claim

Evidence Contradicting The Claim

1. The statement read from the Affidavit 1. Mr. Christenson's testimony that he
that Mr. Christenson signed the 1985
bought the Property at the tax sale in May
Deed to Zions intending to convey only
1984 to protect the Property for Zions
his interest in the Property as trustee of the Bank. [R. 1380 at 8-9.]
Cape Trust. [R. 1379 at 24-25.]
2. Mr. Christenson testified that "we try
to be specific as to what trust I'm
conveying (inaudible) signing it" and
"You wouldn't put 'Trustee' in it if you
were signing (inaudible). [R. 1379 at 39.]

2. Mr. Christenson's testimony that he
conveyed the Property to Zions Bank in
exchange for Zions reimbursing him for
what he paid to purchase the Property at
the tax sale. [R. 1380 at 10-12.]
3. There is no evidence that at the time
Mr. Christenson signed the 1985 Deed to
Zions, he actually held any interest in the
Property as trustee of Cape Trust or any
other trust. [See TWNI at n.2.]
4. After the 1985 Deed to Zions was
recorded, the Utah County Recorder's
Office showed that title to the Property
was vested in Zions, not Mr. Christenson.
[R. 1380 at 91; Ex. 8 at % 7.]
5. At no time following the recording of
the 1985 Deed to Zions did the Utah
County Assessor's Office assess property
taxes on the Property to Mr. Christenson.
[R. 1380 at 91; Ex. 8 at f 8.]

Claim

Evidence Contradicting The Claim
6. Mr. Christenson had his company,
Franklin Financial, purchase the Property
from Zions in 1986. [R. 1380 at 16.]
7. Franklin Financial borrowed money
from Zions to purchase the Property in
1986, and pledged the Property to Zions to
secure the loan. [R. 1380 at 20-21; Ex. 6.]
8. Mr. Christenson did not show the
Property to be an asset owned by him on
his Financial Statement dated March 1,
1987. [Ex. 10.]
9. In the SLC Lawsuit filed in 1996, Mr.
Christenson did not claim to be the owner
of the Property. [Ex.8.]
10. The Third District Court ruled in its
Summary Judgment Order in the SLC
Lawsuit that Mr. Christenson had no
ownership interest in the Property. [Ex.
9.]

